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ARTICLE
HOW DO WE DEAL WITH ALL THE BODIES?
A REVIEW OF RECENT CEMETERY AND
HUMAN REMAINS LEGAL ISSUES
Ryan M. Seidemann'
I. Introduction
The world's population is somewhere in the neighborhood of seven
billion people.2 One thing is certain about every one of these seven
billion living inhabitants of Earth: they will all die sometime. Then
what? The disposal of the dead has been treated differently by differ-
ent cultures throughout time.' However, one fairly constant popular
mechanism for dealing with the sheer numbers of dead people is to
inter them in the ground.' This method of disposal, while typically
putting human remains out of sight and out of mind, creates
problems of its own. Where do we put all of these people? What hap-
pens (legally) to the land when we put people in it? What happens
when we do something wrong with the bodies? What happens when
Mother Nature interferes with our plans for the disposition of our
dead?
These issues may be morbid, but they are ever-increasing realities
that regulators and attorneys are having and will have to address. Ex-
1. Ryan M. Seidemann holds a B.A. (Florida State Upiv.) and M.A. (Louisiana
State Univ.) in anthropology as well as a B.C.L. and aJ.D. in law (Louisiana
State Univ.). He is the Section Chief of the Lands & Natural Resources
Section, Civil Division, Louisiana Department of Justice. He is also a
Registered Professional Archaeologist. The views and opinions expressed
herein are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the
position of the Louisiana Department of Justice or the Attorney General.
Special thanks are due to William T. Hawkins for assisting with the initial
case reviews, to Tracy Poissot for assistance with organizing the final version
of this paper, and to Sam Kalen for some last minute thoughts and
commentary on the subject matter.
2. United States Department of Commerce, United States Census Bureau,
U.S. and World Population Clock http://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last vis-
ited Oct. 23, 2013).
3. See generally Kenneth V. Iserson, DEATH TO DusT: WHAT HAPPENS To DEAD
BODIES? Tucson (1993).
4. David Charles Sloan, THE LAST GREAT NECESSITY: CEMETERIES IN AMERICAN
HISTORY, 1-9, (1991).
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amples of the problems noted above are multitude. When Hurricane
Isaac rolled ashore in Louisiana in 2012, hundreds of previously-in-
terred humans were uprooted and distributed across the landscape.5
First responders had to deal with the collection and identification of
these remains in a manner consistent with the law and they had to do
it as carefully and efficiently as possible.' Seven years out from Hurri-
cane Katrina's wrath on the Gulf Coast, the Federal Emergency Man-
agement Agency is still dealing with numerous issues related to
conflicts between reconstruction and having found cemeteries that no
one remembered.'
The issues of reconstruction and identification are not limited to
the Gulf Coast and they are not limited to storms. Cemeteries are
being impacted by development all across the country. How do you
handle the balance between the needs of the living (i.e., develop-
ment) and the needs of the dead (i.e., preservation)? In instances
where development threatens cemetery property, emotions run high.
In many situations, the expense and public relations nightmare cre-
ated by such situations are enough to dissuade the development.'
These cases are not rare. Recently, in Ohio, it was learned that the
markers for a historic cemetery had been removed in the 1920s to
allow for farming and that, over time, as the cemetery faded from
memory, the property was slated for neighborhood development.' In
Alabama, a historic cemetery that likely extends beyond its marked
boundaries has threatened to halt Wal-Mart development on adjacent
property."o Similar scenarios whereby cemeteries are found or alleged
to be somewhere previously unknown are playing out nationwide: in a
historic home demolition drama and railroad construction in Penn-
sylvania (two different projects)," in road development in Iowa," in a
5. Benjamin Alexander-Bloch, Searching for their final resting place: Work contin-
ues to identify coffins, tombs unearthed by Isaac's surge, TIMES-PICAYUNE B, Nov.
16, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 24389120.
6. Id.
7. R. Stephanie Bruno, School district razes two more N.O. buildings: Lafon, Ken-
nedy won't be replaced, TIMES-PICAYUNE B, Septt. 4, 2011, available at 2011
WLNR 17491645. See also Op. Att'y Gen. Nos. 10-0018; 10-0258; 10-0259
(2010).
8. See e.g., Robbie Brown, Slave Graves, Somewhere, Complicate a Wal-Mart's Path,
N.Y. TIMES A15, May 16, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 10297614; Julia Reyn-
olds, Man Wants to Build Home on Sandy Springs Cemetery Property, Fox 5 NEWS
- ATLANTA (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.myfoxatlanta.com/story/196260
34/man-wants-to-build-home-on-sandy-springs-burial-site.
9. Erin Kelly, Homes May be Built on Wood County Cemetery, WTOL (Mar. 9,
2012), http://www.toledonewsnow.com/story/17125075/.
10. Robert Palmer, Cemetery Evidence Could Stall Walmart, TIMEs DAILY (Apr. 2,
2012) available at http://www.timesdaily.com/archives/articles_e7bb306d-
e9e7-517d-a8fD-a4el8e9e8da.html?mode=image&photo=0.
11. Ron Devlin, Cemetery Claim Might End Demolition Plan in Maxatawny, READING
EAGLE (KRTBN) (PA), August 12, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 16187599;
Anonymous, Duffy Dig Ends, Ir. Voice 18, Nov. 2, 2011 available at 2011
WLNR 24440994.
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church construction project in Hawaii,1 3 in Indiana at the site of a
proposed convention center," in California at the site of a proposed
dam and cultural center (two different projects),1" in Illinois for an
airport expansion, 16 for a reservoir project in Utah," and for residen-
tial developments in Missouri and Mississippi.18
Naturally, the more shocking cemetery and human remains issues
are those involving desecration. There is no geographic limit to the
cemetery desecration reported in recent years. In 2012, federal and
state law enforcement arrested individuals on charges of desecrating a
Native American burial mound in Mississippi." In Florida, one man
was arrested on desecration charges when he dug up a seventy-five-
20
year-old grave and was found in possession of human remains. Al-
though the motives for the latter example are unknown,2 1 the former
was an effort to extract artifacts for sale.2 In California, four men
were arrested for stealing metal name plaques off of Chico-area graves
to sell as scrap metal. Kennedy and Astor graves were among some
12. Magdalene Landegent, Archaeologists join Crews at Road Work Sites, LEMARs
DAILY SENTINEL (Oct. 12, 2011) http://www.lesmarssentinel.com/story/177
2909.html.
13. Andrew Gomes, Lawsuit Again Stops Kawaiaha'o Work, HONOLULU STAR-AD-
VERTISER (Nov. 25, 2011), http://www.staradvertiser.com/s?action=login&f
=y&id=134481458&id=134481458.
14. Graves Dating to 1800s Found in S. Ind. City Park, PosT TRIBUNE (Dec. 12,
2011, 10:57 PM), http://posttrib.suntimes.com/news/9206966-418/graves-
dating-to-1800s-found-in-s-ind-city-park.html.
15. Miriam Raferty, Viejas Granted Restraining Order to Protect Sacred Burial
Ground, EAST COUNTY MAGAZINE (June 8, 2010) http://eastcountymagazine
.org/node/3493; Sanra Ritten, Unearthed Cemetery Halts L.A. Cultural Center
Construction, INDIAN COUNTRY (Jan. 24, 2011), http://indiancountrytoday
medianetwork.com/article/unearthed-cemetery-halts-1.a.-cultural-center-
construction-13186.
16. David Schaper, O'Hare Growth May Mean Moving a Cemetery, NPR (Nov. 19,
2005 12:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=
5020426.
17. John Hollenhorst, Modern-day Project Disrupts Ancient Burial Site, KSL (Feb. 7,
2011 10:05 PM), http://www.ksl.com/?sid=14297785.
18. Chris Joyner, Cemeteries on Family Land Raise Problems, 9/30/10 CLARION-
LEDGER (Sept. 30, 2010 12:32 AM), www.clarionledger.com/article/
20100930/NEWS/9300349/Cemetaries-family-land-raise-problems; Chris
Joyner, Family Cemeteries Conflict with Land Development, USA TODAY (Oct. 5,
2010 2:28 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-10-05-
family-burial-plotsN.htm.
19. Wayne Hereford, Indian Mounds in Monroe County Desecrated, WTVA (Mar.
19, 2012 10:42 AM), http://www.wtva.com/news/local/story/Indian-
mounds-in-Monroe-County-desecrated/o77kECW2LUS9c9MMOShU-g.cs
px.




22. Hereford, supra note 19.
23. Four Arrested for Grave Desecration, BREMERTON PATRIOT (Nov. 16, 2011 8:51
PM), http://www.bremertonpatriot.com/news/134013508.html.
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300 tombstones that were toppled in a Rhode Island cemetery in 2011
in an incident that seems to have stemmed from random delin-
quency.2 4 These are merely examples of the numerous desecration
stories recently reported.
People have fought over the control of cemeteries in Alabama,2 5
Indiana," and Florida. Zoning matters have been at the heart of
cemetery disputes in Alabama. In matters of general torts related to
cemeteries and human remains, a child in Utah was killed when a
grave marker fell on him29 and a dispute arose when a grave space was
moved without notifying the family in Texas.so Finally, as discussed at
length herein, regulatory matters, such as whether licenses are
needed to sell caskets, arose in Louisiana."
The sum total of these issues in recent years demonstrates that cem-
eteries and human remains issues are a matter of constant, if not
growing, concern for regulators and the legal community (not to
mention the descendant communities).82 It is with this prevalence of
problems in mind that this review is here undertaken.
II. Cemeteries and Human Remains in the Courts
A. Tort cases regarding cemeteries and human remains
As is evident from the previous section of this paper, things often go
wrong in cemeteries or with human remains. These problems are
24. Ian MacDougal, Vandalism in Old Newport Cemetery Provokes Outrage, CNS
NEWs (June 5, 2011 12:28 PM), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/vandal-
ism-old-newport-cemetery-provokes-outrage.
25. Kala Kachmar, Trial to Decide Ownership ofLincoln Cemetery, MONTGOMERY AD-
VERTISER (Sep. 26, 2012 2:14 AM), http://www.montgomeryadvertiser
.com/article/20120926/NEWS01/309260050/.
26. Marc Chase, North Township Trustee Takes Ownership of Troubled Oak Hill Cem-
etery, NWI TIMES (Jun. 25, 2012), http://www.nwitimes.com/news/local/
lake/hammonoVnorth-township-trustee-takes-ownership-of-troubled-oak-
hill-cemetary/articl3dc69d66-7e91-5b44-be0f-5704ce608c34.html.
27. Gordon Jackson, Plot Sales Banned in Historic Portion of St. Marys Cemetery,
Nov. 14, 2010, FLA. TIMES UNION (Jacksonville). See also, Justin Sacharoff,
Quarrels Over Where Loved Ones are Buried Brings Attention to Burial Rights in
Florida, Mar. 17, 2011, FLA. TIMES UNION (Jacksonville).
28. Jay Reeves, Ala. Man Fights to Keep Wife Buried in Front Yard, YAHOO! NEWS,
(Aug. 20, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/ala-man-fights-keep-wife-burried-
front-yard-153303814.html.; Jay Reeves, James Davis Front Yard Grave: Court
Won't Stop Removal of Ala. Man's Buried Wfe, THE HUFFINGTON POST, (Aug.
22, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/22/james-davis-ala-
bama-front-yard-grave n-nl822871.html.
29. Michelle Rindels, Boy, 4, Dies After Tombstone Falls on Him in Utah, YAHOO!
NEWs (Jul. 6, 2012).
30. Morgan Smith, After Grave is Moved, Regulations are Scrutinized, Dec. 17, 2010,
N.Y. TIMES, at A29.
31. Ramon Antonio Vargas, Covington Monks Win Right to Sell Caskets, Jul. 21,
2011, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans).
32. Id.
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sometimes a result of negligence and sometimes of intentional acts."
This section of the paper is an amalgamation of recent tort cases that
are the result of such intentional and negligent acts.
In Conner v. Norman Sosebee Funeral Home,34 a funeral home was sued
for injuries sustained by a seven-year-old when a 400 pound marker
fell on his foot in the funeral home's parking lot." As noted in the
section above, toppling markers are sometimes a problem in ceme-
teries." Thus, even though this case arises from events that occurred
in a parking lot, it is relevant to the subject matter of this paper.3 7
In this case, the appellate court found the funeral home liable for
the injuries that ultimately resulted in the amputation of several of the
child's toes." The marker in this case was a display model kept at the
funeral home which was not secured to its base, nor was the base se-
cured to the ground." The court found that the unsecured marker
was inherently unsafe.4 0 Although this reality does not specifically
make a property owner negligent, the owner's knowledge in this case
that children regularly played on the display markers and that the
markers were unsecured did impute negligence to the owner."
This case was not a review of the merits of the case, per se.
Rather, it was an appellate court's review of a granting of summary
judgment in favor of the funeral home.4 3 Thus, the appeals court,
finding that negligence did exist on the part of the funeral home,
overturned the summary judgment and left for a jury the question of
whether the child had been adequately warned about the hazards of
the markers so as to mitigate the funeral home's damages." Nonethe-
less, this case clearly stands for the proposition that cemetery markers,
wherever they are located, must be properly set and secured to avoid
injuries and premises liability."
In Rogers v. Louisville Land Co.," Ms. Rogers sued a cemetery com-
pany for distress due to the alleged failure to maintain the cemetery in
which her son was buried.17 The district court awarded Ms. Rogers
33. Id.




37. See generally Id.
38. Id. at 535-36.
39. Id. at 536.
40. See id. at 538.
41. See id.
42. Id. at 534.
43. See id. at 538.
44. Id. at 538-39.
45. See id at 538.
46. Rogers v. Louisville Land Co., No. E22010-00991-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL
2112766 at *1 (Tenn. App. 2011).
47. Id. at *1.
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over $330,000, $250,000 of which was for punitive damages and
$45,000 of which was for intentional infliction of emotional distress
("IIED").48 On appeal, the court found that Ms. Rogers had not
proven IIED and reversed the IIED and punitive damages awards.4 9
The testimony presented at trial included information on the lack of
mowing, the failure to maintain roads, and the failure to do repairs to
monuments.o Much of the jurisprudence cited by the plaintiff on
appeal, in an effort to maintain her success at the district court, re-
lated to emotional distress in "mutilation, negligent embalming, and
wrongful disinterment" cases.5 ' The court did not find any of these
cases persuasive for the notion that poor cemetery maintenance could
cause emotional distress on the level of corpse mutilation.5 2 Although
the court noted its sympathy for the plaintiffs plight, it found actual
evidence of her emotional distress to be "at best sparse."" Based on
the lack of evidence of severe emotional distress on the record, the
court overturned that judgment.54 The punitive damages award,
which was based on the IIED award, also fell.5"
In Leathermon v. Grandview Memorial Gardens, Inc.,"* plaintiffs in a
class action suit brought claims against a cemetery based upon the
alleged improper installation of lawn crypts (and the resulting dam-
ages to their loved ones' remains)." An example of the damage al-
leged is the assertion that "[to] the family's horror, Fred
Leathermon's body and casket were significantly and prematurely de-
teriorated because of water that had pooled in the improperly in-
stalled lawn crypt."5 ' However, the court declined to permit a
negligent infliction of emotional distress ("NIED") claim for situations
that did not include family witnessing a death or serious bodily in-
jury." The court similarly rejected claims for tortious interference
with a dead body, noting that this tort allowed recovery for emotional








55. Id. at *5. On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court considered and made
pronouncements related to some of the tort theories raised in this case.
Rogers v. Louisville Land Co., 367 S.W.3d 196, 204-210 (Tenn. 2012). How-
ever, none of these pronouncements have any bearing on the cemetery or
human remains issues in this case and are thus not reviewed here. The
holdings of the appellate court discussed herein were affirmed. Id. at 216-
217.
56. Leathermon v. Grandview Memorial Gardens, Inc., No. 4:07-cv-137-SEB-
WGH, 2011 WL 2445980 (S.D. In. 2011).
57. Id. at *5.
58. Id.
59. Id. at *6.
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had no standing to bring."o Further, finding no evidence of intent,
the court rejected the plaintiffs' IIED claims."' The court rejected the
plaintiffs' fraud claims as lacking the requisite specificity.6 2 Finally,
the court did find enough merit to allow the plaintiffs to amend their
petition for a deceptive trade practices act claim that basically stated
that the cemetery knew that the lawn crypts were defective or improp-
erly maintained and thus they should be liable under state law for
concealing these defects.6 " Although the deceptive trade practices act
claims had tolled by the time of the suit, the court allowed the claims
to be brought on allegations that the cemetery had concealed the evi-
dence until after the statute of limitations had run.' At the time of
this writing, there is no decision as to the validity of the one surviving
claim in this suit.6 5
The substance of the Rogers and Leathermon cases instruct us that
claims for emotional distress for cemetery maintenance will likely fail
as a tort theory." It is very difficult to prove that maintenance
problems rise to the level of tortious conduct. Such claims must be
brought, when available, on contract (express or implied) breach or
state law violation theories.6 ' In the absence of such bases and with-
out wanton recklessness and disregard by the cemetery, tort claims for
the failure to maintain cemetery property largely seem to be
unsupportable."
In Kogelshatz v. Gendernalik Funeral Home, Inc.," the court was
presented with several tort claims for alleged delays in the interment
of cremated remains.7 0 In this case, the decedent's family sued a fu-
neral home and cemetery that were in charge of the interment of
their loved one's cremated remains." In this case, the remains were
not lost. Rather, the cemetery placed the remains within a temporary
mausoleum niche awaiting instructions as to the final disposition of
the remains from the funeral home." The delay from cremation to
burial was less than a year." The family sued the funeral home and
cemetery alleging that the defendants owed obligations to the family
60. Id. at *7.
61. Id.
62. Id. at *8.
63. Id. at *8-9.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See id.; Rogers v. Louisville Land Co., No. E22010-00991-COA-R3-CV, 2011
WL 2112766 (Tenn. App. 2011).
67. See Rogers, 2011 WL 2112766 at *1.
68. Id. See also Leathermon, 2011 WL 2445980.
69. Kogelshatz v. Gendernalik Funeral Homes, Inc., 2010 WL 4628678 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2010).
70. Id. at *1
71. Id. at *2.
72. Id. at *1-2.
73. Id. at *2.
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to inform them of any delays in the interment process.7 ' The family
alleged that the defendants' failure to notify them of the delay consti-
tuted negligence.7 ' The court disagreed, finding no evidence of reck-
less conduct by the cemetery, but rather alluding to the reality that
the cemetery did the right thing by waiting for instructions regarding
interment from the funeral home.
In this case, the family also brought NIED claims against the ceme-
tery, alleging that they were in "extreme shock" when they were made
aware that their mother's ashes were not where they thought they
were.7 7 Not surprisingly, the court rejected the NIED claims, as there
was no evidence that the family had witnessed the alleged shocking
event.78
Finally, the family alleged conversion when they were not refunded
for the cremation and interment services. However, because the
cemetery cremated the remains and interred them, the court found
no conversion.80 The court also summarily rejected allegations of de-
ceptive trade practices and breach of contract.'
This case is interesting but not likely very important. It is certainly
indicative of the heightened sensitivity of grieving families." It is also
indicative of the importance of following internal protocols, as the
court repeatedly noted that the cemetery properly followed reasona-
ble rules and procedures related to the temporary and permanent in-
terment of the remains in the case."
In Martin v. Hodges Chapel, L.L.C.,84 an Alabama appellate court was
presented with the question of when families' rights to bring a tort
action against a cemetery expire. In this case, the plaintiffs interred
their relatives between 1990 and 2004, but did not file suit alleging
that the cemetery had not kept records of interment locations until
2010." The major point of this case for the purposes of this paper is
whether the family's rights to sue the cemetery had expired.8 7 In Ala-
bama, there is a 20 year rule of repose that, in matters related to buri-
als, creates a hold on normal statutes of limitations for a period of 20
years following the occurrence of harm related to an interment."
74. Id. at *3.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at *4.
78. Id.
79. Id. at *5.
80. Id.
81. Id. at *6-7.
82. Id. at *3-4.
83. See id.
84. Martin v. Hodges Chapel, L.L.C., 89 So.3d 756 (Al. Civ. App. 2011).
85. See id.
86. Id. at 759.
87. See id. at 760.
88. Id. at 760.
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In Martin, the cemetery defendant alleged that the rule of repose
ran from the burial of each individual and that, at least as to the early
burials, that time had run by the time suit was filed." The court dis-
agreed stating that the rule of repose period will,
begin to run at different times for different types of claims.
For example, because damages are an essential element of a
tort claim, the rule of repose does not begin to run as to a
tort claim until "the defendant's tortious act proximately
causes the plaintiff to suffer an actual injury." . . . "A suit on a
breach-of-contract claim, on the other hand, may be com-
menced as soon as the defendant breaches the contract, re-
gardless of whether the plaintiff has suffered an actual
injury."90
Thus, in this case, where the plaintiffs only learned that their loved
ones' graves could not be located until inquiring as to their locations
in 2009, the rule of repose ran from 2009 as to tort claims." For the
breach of contract claims, the court recognized that the event trigger-
ing the beginning of the statute of limitations occurred when the cem-
etery did not keep adequate records and not from the time of the
plaintiffs' discovery of this shortcoming. 2
In Warden v. Dudley Hoffman Mortuary," a plaintiff sued a crematory
alleging that his wife's remains were cremated with those of another
person and that the crematory stole the gold from her dental crowns
before cremation." Ajury ruled in favor of the crematory, finding no
evidence of the allegations.9 5 On appeal, the plaintiff alleged that the
cremation contract he signed with the crematory was "unconsciona-
ble" because the provisions dealing with the removal of dental work
was disturbing and it was in small print." The court noted that, for a
contract to be unconscionable, it must be oppressive and cause sur-
prise." The court, in spite of the small print and the fact that the
plaintiff was upset by the dental work removal, did not find that the
contract met the standards for being unconscionable. The court
also noted that the plaintiffs "fragile emotional state at the time he
entered into the contract, while understandable, is not relevant to a
determination of whether it is unconscionable."" The appellate
89. Id.
90. Id. at 762 (internal citations omitted).
91. Id. at 763-64.
92. Id. at 764.
93. Warden v. Dudley Hoffman Mortuary, 2010 WL 1531407 (Ca. Ct. App. Apr.
19, 2010).
94. Id. at *1.
95. Id.
96. Id. at *2.
97. Id.
98. Id. at *3.
99. Id.
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court never reached the substantive issue of the allegations of com-
mingled remains, as it found that the evidence to support these allega-
tions was properly excluded by the trial court. 00
The importance of this case is that the reality that prosthetics and
dental work must be removed in advance of cremations' is not, per
se, actionable as shocking or unconscionable as long as it is disclosed
in the contract with the family.10 2 There is likely little precedential
value to this case, as it relies heavily on California legal principles, but
it is interesting, nonetheless.10 3
In another cremation case, Seals v. H&F, Inc.,o the Tennessee Su-
preme Court was faced with a tort suit that rested on whether a crema-
tory had proper authority to conduct a cremation."0 ' In this case, the
decedent left no directions for the disposition of his remains."0 ' The
decedent was cremated upon a request by his fianc6e and minor son
and the decedent's mother sued for wrongful cremation.o
The crematory defended against the mother's claims by asserting
that, although the law recognizes the superior position of the
mother's right to control the disposition of remains (as a surviving
parent when there is no spouse or minor child), it relied on the fian-
c6e's and child's assurances that the decedent's parents were dead,
that a minor child had rights to control the disposition of his father's
remains, and that, because the crematory did not operate maliciously,
it was immune under state law. 0 8
The Court recognized that, in the absence of written direction to
the contrary from the decedent, the statutory provision governing dis-
position of the dead must control.10 In this case, that law recognized
the mother as the proper party to control disposition of the de-
ceased.110 The court rejected the crematory's argument that the law
of intestate succession, which does provide rights to minor children,
should apply, as those laws deal with the disposition of the decedent's
material things, not the decedent's body."' Another interesting com-
ponent of this analysis is that the court recognized that human re-
mains are not property in a traditional sense, thus meaning that the
100. Id. at *6-7.
101. Id.
102. Id. at *2-3.
103. Id. Some portions of this case were appealed again and are reported at
Warden v. Dudley Hoffman Mortuary, 2012 WL 1572125 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012).
However, the issues raised were largely related to attorneys fees and are
thus not relevant to this review.
104. Seals v. H & F, Inc., 301 S.W.3d 237 (Tenn. 2010).
105. Id. at 239-40.
106. Id. at 240.
107. Id. at 239-40.
108. Id. at 240.
109. Id. at 246-47.
110. Id. at 247.
111. Id. at 245-46.
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law related to the disposition of a decedent's property cannot apply to
the body itself.'12 The court also discussed the state's anatomical gift
act as a possible proxy for control of the body of the deceased, but
found that law inapplicable due to the specific nature of the law re-
garding the actual disposition of remains and because that law also
did not give any authority to minor children."'
As to whether state law provided some immunity to the crematory
because it did not act maliciously, the court found that this immunity
was not absolute."' The court noted that the crematory must adhere
to the law related to the right to control disposition of remains in
order to avail itself of the immunity." Because minors cannot con-
trol disposition, the court found that the crematory's reliance on the
minor's disposition instructions barred it from availing itself of the
limitation of liability.' 16
None of the outcomes of this case are surprising. As the court, it-
self, noted, the law on control of disposition is clear and it merely
applied the clear law to this case. 1 17
Before the Eastern District of Wisconsin in Jackson v. McKay-Davis
Funeral Home, Inc.,"' were questions of liability for several parties
when cremated remains were lost in transit."' In this case, a wife and
daughter of the deceased brought an action alleging breach of fiduci-
ary duty, negligent handling of human remains, and NIED when the
deceased's remains were apparently taken from the family's front
porch after delivery from out-of-state by a courier. 20 In this decision,
which was the result of a preliminary hearing regarding the plaintiffs'
standing, the court recognized that standing for remains mistreat-
ment allegations is afforded, in Wisconsin, to those "who have suf-
fered emotionally or physically from the defendant's negligent
conduct,"12 1 rather than based upon some theory related to someone
who has quasi-property rights in the deceased's body.122 The court
also rejected a theory that standing should be limited to those with the
legal right to disposition of a body. 12 ' Although this superficially ap-
pears to be in conflict with the Tennessee decision in Seals, supra, it is
112. Id. at 243.
113. Id. at 245.
114. Id. at 249.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 253.
117. Id.
118. Jackson v. McKay-Davis Funeral Home, Inc., 830 F.Supp.2d 635 (E.D. Wis.
2011).
119. Id. at 642.
120. Id. at 639.
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not. 12 In Seals, the court looked to who had the right to control dis-
position, not, as in Jackson, who had the right to recover for alleged
mistreatment. 1 2 5 The former is clearly set by statute in most cases, as
the Jackson court recognized,126 and the latter is not.'2 7
Aside from standing, which the court here found the plaintiffs to
have, 1 28 the court analyzed whether the funeral home owed the dece-
dent's family a fiduciary duty with regard to the shipment of the cre-
mated remains at issue.' 2 ' Although the court recognized that the
plaintiffs had placed trust in the funeral home in a colloquial sense, it
did not find this trust to rise to the level of creating a fiduciary duty
such that liability for the loss of the remains would lie as against the
funeral home. 3 0
In Jackson, the court noted the difficulty of proving NIED claims
and indicated that success on these claims was unlikely in this case,
but it also found that the defendants did not meet their burden of
showing that damage had not occurred and deferred this matter to a
trial on the merits.13 2 Similarly, with regard to the negligent mistreat-
ment of remains claim, the court found that the defendants had not
met the burden for summary dismissal of the claims and deferred
these issues to the trial.'3 3 With this claim, the court may have tipped
its hand as to its perspective at trial when it noted the ease of avoiding
the loss of remains in this case had there simply been a "signature
upon delivery" required in the delivery of the remains. 3 1
One lesson from this case appears to be that the right to bring suit
for injury from mistreatment of remains is broader than just who may
have a right to dispose of remains.13 1 It is probable that this idea will
be implemented elsewhere. Another lesson is to make sure that,
when shipping human remains, the "signature upon delivery" box is
checked on the shipping form to ensure that the remains are not left
on a doorstep to be stolen.' 6
124. See Seals v. H & F, Inc., 301 S.W.3d 237, 252-53 (Tenn. 2010) (describing
the right to control exclusively).
125. Id.; See also Jackson, 830 F.Supp.2d at 644-45.
126. SeeJackson, 830 F.Supp.2d at 643 (Describing the case law dependent on
disposition).
127. See id. (noting that Wisconsin Courts have not addressed the issue and are
facing two different sources of law).
128. Id. at 647.
129. Id. at 647-48.
130. Id. at 649-50.
131. Id. at 650-56.
132. Id. at 655-56.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 655.
135. Id. at 650-56.
136. Id. at 655.
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In the Utah case of Jones v. Norton,"' the plaintiffs claim that the
defendant mortuary caused them to suffer IIED when its employee
allegedly made an unsightly cut on the deceased's neck."'s Not sur-
prisingly, as with the other cases reviewed in this article, the court did
not find sufficient evidence of outrageous conduct to support an IIED
claim.'" Specifically, the court could not find evidence suggesting
any intent by the defendant's employee, nor could the court identify
reasonable evidence of the extent of the cut to determine whether it
was shocking or not.14 0 Accordingly, the plaintiffs IIED claims were
dismissed on summary judgment."'
The recent Florida case of Mellette v. Trinity Memorial Cemetery, Inc." 2
represents an unusual example of a claim for emotional distress that
was not rejected by the courts."' In this case, over a widow's express
objection, a cemetery disinterred her deceased husband on a request
by his mother and provided for the transfer of the remains from Flor-
ida to Texas."' In this case the mother had paid for the interment
space, so the cemetery did not check the files to determine whether
the mother was the next of kin.' 45 In this situation, under Florida law,
the widow, even though she had remarried, was the next of kin."' In
addition, the widow had warned the cemetery that she was concerned
that the mother might try to have the remains moved.14 1
When the widow learned of the move, she brought suit against the
cemetery for both tortuous interference with a dead body and reckless
infliction of emotional distress.'4  The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the cemetery, finding, as a matter of law, that the
137. Jones v. Norton, No. 2:09-cv-730-TC, 2012 WL 3062022 (D. Utah Mar. 29,
2013).
138. Id. at *1.
139. Id. at *4.
140. Id. at *2-4.
141. Id. at *4. The plaintiffs in this matter also tried later to repackage their tort
claims under the guise of "negligence, gross negligence, and professional
malpractice." Jones v. Norton, No. 2:09-cv-730-TC, 2012 WL 3985645 at *1
(D. Utah Sept. 11, 2012). However, the court rebuffed that attempt noting
that, " [i]f the court were to [allow such an amendment], then the entry of
summary judgment in a defendant's favor would be meaningless." Id. The
court also poignantly noted that "not every wrong is legally redressable"
when considering the plaintiffs attempts to reassert their original claims.
Id.
142. Mellette v. Trinity Memorial Cemetery, Inc., 95 So.3d 1043 (Fla.App. 2 Dist.
2012).
143. Id. at 1044.
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facts did not support either claim.149 The appellate court reversed the
district court on both counts.1 50
With respect to the tortuous interference claim, the court noted
that the cemetery was required to demonstrate that the wrongdoing
that it had admitted to (i.e., breaking Florida law by permitting some-
one other than the next of kin to direct a disinterment) "was not will-
ful or wanton as a matter of law."15 1 Comparing the admitted actions
to another case in which tortuous interference was found when a fu-
neral home withheld a body for the failure to pay embalming fees, the
court here held that,
[c]ertainly, a surviving spouse's right to direct the disposition
of her deceased's body is no less invaded when the party to
whom she has entrusted the body disinters it and ships it out
of state without her knowledge and against her expressed
wishes. 1 5 2
The court then noted that,
[w]e cannot conclude as a matter of law that Trinity's con-
duct did not exhibit an "entire want of care of attention to
duty" or was not so wanton as to render it liable for inten-
tionally interfering with a dead body.1 5 1
Thus, the court reversed the tortuous interference decision so that the
case could go to trial.154
On the same facts, the court in this case also held that "we cannot
say that as a matter of law Trinity's conduct did not reach the level of
outrageousness required to support" a claim for emotional distress. 1 5
The basic standard that the court applied was "whether the recitation
of facts was such that an average member of the community would
exclaim 'outrageous!' 15 ' The court believed that the cemetery's con-
duct fit the requirements for this tort as well and remanded the case
for further proceedings.1 7
This case is something of an anomaly in those reported here. The
court actually favored the elusive finding of reckless infliction of emo-
tional distress.'15 It is hard to say that this case is a bellwether consid-
ering the substantial jurisprudence that dissuades such findings.
However, the case is certainly a cautionary tale suggesting that ceme-
149. Id. at 1046.
150. Id. at 1044-45.
151. Id. at 1046.
152. Id. at 1047.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id at 1048.
156. Id. at 1049 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965)).
157. Id.
158. Id.
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teries that negligently or intentionally violate the law may be held ac-
countable in tort.159
In a case stemming from the Tri-State Crematory scandal,16 0 Akers v.
Prime Succession of Tennessee, Inc., 6 1 a Tennessee appeals court consid-
ered matters of fraud and remains mishandling.'6 2 One of the major
problems in this case was that the decedent's remains, due to the na-
ture of the Tri-State scandal, could never be positively identified."'
Thus, without evidence (i.e., a body), the question presented to the
court was: could the family of the deceased maintain an action for the
mishandling of remains?' 6 4 The trial court let the matter go to trial
and the jury found in favor of the family.'6 1
On appeal, despite the fact that no remains attributable to the de-
ceased could be definitively identified, the appellate court found that
sufficient corroborating evidence existed to support the mishandling
claims.' 6 6 The appellate court also found, consistent with the jury's
findings, that the Tri-State's conduct was intentional, outrageous, and
caused "serious mental injury."' 6 7 These holdings were subsequently
upheld by the Tennessee Supreme Court. 6 s
The result of the Akers case is not surprising, considering the enor-
mity of the Tri-State scandal. It is doubtful and unlikely that the Tri-
State cases, such as Akers, have much precedential effect outside of
egregious fraud cases.' 6 1 However, due to the egregious nature of this
case, it is likely that, in the future, courts may rely on the logic of Akers
to allow damages claims to roceed when positive identification of ac-
tual remains is impossible.'7
159. Id.
160. See generally, Officials End Search of Georgia Crematory, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7,
2002, at A25. Explaining that the Tri-State Crematory scandal refers to the
Georgia crematory that, in 2002, was discovered to have been disposing of
bodies on its property rather than cremating them per agreements with
local funeral homes. In the end, more than three hundred bodies were
discovered in varying states of decomposition hidden in every portion of
the crematory's property, including a small lake.
161. Akers v. Prim Succession of Tenn., Inc., et al., 2011 WL 4908396 (Tenn.
App. 2011).
162. Id. at 2.
163. Id. at 2-13.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 16.
166. Id. at 18.
167. Id. at 22-23.
168. Akers v. Prime Succession of Tenn., Inc., 387 S.W.3d 495 (Tenn. 2012), cert.
denied Marsh v. Akers, 133 S.Ct. 1464 (2013).
169. See generally id. at 504 (the opinion implies that the fraud was intentional or
reckless and established Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress).
170. See generally id. at 500, 504 (the jury found Marsh liable for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress and upheld the damages to Akers although
Dr. Berryman could not scientifically determine whether the cremations
belonged to Akers or someone else).
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In the North Carolina case of Birtha v. Stonemor, North Carolina,
LLC,"' the North Carolina Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court's
dismissal of a litany of claims stemming from a cemetery's alleged
moving of grave markers and losing grave spaces."7 2 The bulk of the
claims in this case were barred due to the tolling of various statutes of
limitations."' The plaintiffs' claims in this case were based on negli-
gence and breach of contract.174 Regarding the negligence claim, the
court found that the cemetery's failure to adhere to a law mandating
the maintenance of interment records was not negligence because the
plaintiffs were not the class of individuals intended to be protected by
such a law.175
This assessment by the court, which seems to place the only stand-
ing to assert a claim for a violation of this law with the North Carolina
Cemetery Commission, is preposterous.' 7 1 Such laws exist to protect
the public.' 7 7 While violations of these laws may permit regulatory
action against a cemetery, such violations similarly create standing for
private individuals who are affected by the violations.17' These laws
create not only a regulatory responsibility, they also create a public
protection duty on behalf of the cemeteries that is actionable as a
tort.17 9 The court in this case said as much later in the opinion when
it noted that,
[i]t is well-settled that a "violation of a statute designed to
protect persons or property is a negligent act, and if such
negligence proximately causes injury, the violator is liable.
This is an appropriate allegation on the first cause of action
based on negligence . .'
Thus, the court here internally conflicts with its own opinion.''
The court in this case also fails to find a "continuing wrong" caused
by the cemetery's action, finding that no continual unlawful acts oc-
curred.18 2 Further, the court did not allow the use of the "discovery
rule" to allow an extension of the standard statute of limitations, be-
cause the court did not believe that these alleged actions fit the class
171. Birtha v. Stonemor, North Carolina, LLC, 727 S.E.2d 1(N.C.App. 2012),
review denied 738 S.E.2d 373 (N.C. 2013).
172. Id. at 4.
173. Id. at 7-9.
174. Id. at 4.
175. Id. at 8.
176. See id.
177. Contra id. at 8.
178. Contra id.
179. Contra id.
180. Id. at 9.
181. See id.
182. Id. at 7.
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of harms contemplated to be encompassed within the discovery
rule. 8 3
In this case the court dismissed the bulk of the contract claims
based upon prescription.184 However, for the non-prescribed contract
claims the court held that the cemetery's violation of the law does not
constitute a breach of contract.' 5 Finally, the court also rejected the
plaintiffs' fraud claims.' 86 The court here did not find that the plain-
tiffs were defrauded by any actions of the cemetery and affirmed the
trial court's dismissal of their claims. 8 7
Aside from the erroneous interpretation of the nature of cemetery
regulatory laws,' this case is instructive in at least one other point.
Prescription is a real problem with cemetery tort claims, and to ensure
that your rights are protected as a descendant of a buried individual,
you must visit the grave often and report and act on problems quickly
- an unlikely scenario and likely an unreasonable standard.'
B. Dedication of and Access to Cemeteries
Issues related to the legal implications of a cemetery's presence on
a piece of property and matters related to access to cemeteries have
been the subject of some litigation lately.' The former is a concept
known as the cemetery dedication.' 9 ' This is a property concept that
exists both in common and civil law jurisdictions and restricts the use
of property containing human remains for any purpose other than as
a cemetery. 9 2
In Shilling v. Baker,19 8 the Virginia Supreme Court was required to
determine whether a cemetery actually existed to which a dedication
applied and, if so, whether a zoning ordinance applied to the prop-
erty as a cemetery.194 The particular tract began as an area for the
scattering of cremated remains of members of the Baker family.'
The remains of four people were scattered on the property between
the 1940s and the 1990s.19 I In addition, the area was fenced and con-
183. Id.
184. Id. at 9.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 9-10.
187. Id.
188. See id. at 8.
189. See id. at 6-7.
190. See infra discussion on pp. 22-39.
191. Cemeteries, La. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 10-0275 (Feb. 1, 2011).
192. Id.; Graceland Park Cemetery Co. v. City of Omaha, 114 N.W.2d 29 (Neb.
1962) (citing Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Union Cemetery Ass'n, 104 NJ.
Eq. 326 (N.J. Ct. Chan. 1929).
193. Shilling v. Baker, 691 S.E. 2d 806 (Va. 2010).
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tained memorial plaques commemorating each of the people.' In
the late 1990s, another family member's ashes, in an urn, were in-
terred at the site.198
The trouble began when the current owner (not a Baker family
member) decided to sell the tract that contained the property where
the fence and cremated remains were placed." Part of the sale
agreement included a relocation of the "Baker Cemetery" by 500
feet.20 0 As an intervening problem to the question of whether the
scattering of cremated remains created a cemetery in this case, a local
zoning ordinance was passed in 1984 defining a cemetery.o1 The trial
court determined that the ordinance was controlling and did not con-
template the establishment of a cemetery by anything other than the
interment "of a dead body."20 2 Thus, the trial court found that this
fenced area of scattered remains was not a cemetery and rejected the
family's invitation to apply the common law concept of a cemetery to
the property.203
In Shilling, the Virginia Supreme Court reviewed several examples
of cemeteries and concluded that a cemetery is, "a permanent resting
place either underground or in a confined space or container."2 0 4
The court rejected the concept that a scattering of remains could cre-
ate a cemetery.20o Although this is consistent with the idea that gen-
eral scatterings do not create cemeteries, 206 it does seem contrary to
the concept of whether an area blocked-off and indentified as a ceme-
tery is not a cemetery (e.g., scattering gardens).2 0 7
In Narragansett Improvement Co. v. Wheeler,20 s the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court was presented with the question of whether a govern-
mental preservation entity's identifications of cemeteries on private
property constituted a slander of the private party's titleo.2 " The iden-
tified cemeteries were Native American burial mounds that were doc-
umented on private property to assist in their protection. 210 The
court noted that because the documentation of these mounds was not
a legal registration and because the government entity was an advisory
commission only and could merely document and make recommen-





201. Id. at 808.
202. Id. at 809.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 810.
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., Cemeteries, La. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 10-0275 (Feb. 1, 2011).
207. See id.
208. Narragansett Improvement Co. v. Wheeler, 21 A.3d 430 (R.I. 2011).
209. Id. at 432.
210. Id. at 442-43.
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claims could lie against it.2 1 ' Further, the court found that there was
no slander of title by recommending the preservation of these sites, as
the recommendations were not false and they identified actual fea-
tures on the property (i.e., the cemeteries) that, if they devalued the
property, they did so regardless of the government's recommenda-
tions.2 12 This outcome absolved the government of liability213 and is
consistent with the idea that burials are generally inviolate and that
you acquire property subject to the existence of burials on the
property.214
In Meisel v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp.,2 15 a purchaser of property
brought an action against a title insurance company and a seller
when, after the close of the sale, the purchaser learned that several
Native American mounds were present on the property, at least one of
which was likely a cemetery. 1 6 In this case, one insurer asserted that
the existence of a cemetery constituted a defect not covered by its
policy because the defect occurred as a result of the exercise of police
power.2 1 1 In other words, the insurer was essentially saying that, but
for governmental protections of cemeteries there would be no defect
to the property and the purchaser could do as it pleased (including,
presumably, destroying the cemetery) .21s Along with the claim
against the title insurance company, the purchaser submitted to bind-
ing arbitration in its claims against the seller.21' The arbitrator found
that the presence of the cemetery devalued the property by more than
half the amount paid by the purchaser. 2 20 Nonetheless, the seller was
only cast judgment for $40,000.00 of a total purchase price of
$680,000.00.221 The district court, in the claim against the insurer,
found that any devaluation of the property value was covered by the
title policy, thus negating the argument that the police power was the
basis for the devaluation.2 2 2 In fact, the district court found that the
presence of information regarding the mounds' existence in the Of-
fice of the State Archaeologist constituted evidence of the defect in
the public records which was constructively known to the seller and
211. Id. at 439-41.
212. Id. at 441-42.
213. See id.
214. See e.g., Choppin v. Labranche, 20 So. 681, 682 (La. 1896) (discouraging the
disturbance of the dead except for "lawful necessary purposes"); see also, T.
Scorr GILLIGAN & THOMAS F.H. STUEVE, MORTUARY LAw 49-53 (9th ed.
2005) (noting that disinterment is generally disfavored).
215. Meisel v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., A10-342, 2010 WL 5071294 (Minn. Ct.
App. Dec. 14, 2010).
216. Id. at *1.
217. Id. at *2.
218. See id. at *2.
219. Id.
220. Id. at *4.
221. Id. at *2.
222. Id. at *3.
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title insurer.2 2 ' Thus, this was a known defect that should have been
disclosed. 2 24 The district court granted the purchaser $250,000.00 in
damages (which was the difference between the property value with
and without the mounds) less the $40,000.00 arbitration award. 2
On appeal, the district court's decision that the arbitration award
did not collaterally estop the purchasers from making a separate claim
against the title insurer was determined to be erroneous.226 The ap-
pellate court reasoned that the arbitrator considered all of the issues
and that the claims against the insurers were, effectively, a relitigation
of a previously decided matter.2 27 The appellate court did not reach
the same merits as the district court case.228
The district court's finding that a state archaeologist's files consti-
tute public records, a finding not upset on appeal, may open an en-
tirely new area of public records review to title attorneys.2 Access to
these records may vary from state to state, but they are often much
more comprehensive than mortgage or conveyance records when it
comes to the existence of cemeteries and archaeological sites that
might affect what someone can do with their property. Thus, in juris-
dictions where this information is available to the public, it may be
prudent for title attorneys to check these records before warranting
title.
In Huxfield Cemetery Association v. Elliott,23 0 two separate parties were
vying for control of a cemetery.2 81 In this case, the court spent consid-
erable time discussing the reality that cemeteries do not adhere to the
general concepts of property law.2 82 Also in this case, because the par-
ties stipulated that the cemetery association had maintained the ceme-
tery from 1881 to 2006, it acquired the right to operate the
cemetery.233 This case is unique in that there seems to be little factual
dispute about the nature of the property as a cemetery and who his-
torically maintained the property. Thus, there are no shocking le-
gal revelations in the case.2 35 However, the case is useful in its review
of the primacy of cemetery law over general property law and for the
fact that title to property often does not give the title holder the right
to control the cemeteries that may be located thereon.23 6
223. Id. at *2-3.
224. Id. at *3.
225. Id.
226. Id. at *4.
227. Id. at *5.
228. Id. at *4.
229. See id. at *3.
230. Huxfield Cemetery Ass'n v. Elliot, 698 S.E. 2d 591 (S.C. 2010).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 594.
233. Id. at 595.
234. Id. at 593.
235. See id.
236. Id. at 591.
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In Dumbarton Improvement Association, Inc. v. Druid Ridge Cemetery
Co.,2 37 a cemetery owner sought to sell 36 acres of cemetery property
for development as residential homes. 2" The 36 acre tract at issue
was owned by the cemetery, but had not been used for burials.239 The
district court ruled that a restrictive covenant transferring the prop-
erty and creating the cemetery in 1913 did not restrict the sale of this
property and that the changing character of the surrounding area
since 1913 made any restriction against the use of the property for
development unenforceable. 240 The appeals court found no error
with the original holding and affirmed.2 4 1
This case is somewhat contrary to the general principles of cemetery
dedication. 4 2 Although the 1913 documents did not explicitly dedi-
cate all of the property for cemetery use, the language stating " [t]hat
the said property be maintained and operated as a cemetery," clearly
indicates the intent of the parties. 2 48 Even if this would not act as a
dedication until there was an actual interment, it is clearly a restric-
tion on the development of the property.2 " This case was clearly re-
sults-driven rather than law-driven. 2 4 5 The court gave great weight to
testimony about the changing character of the neighborhood since
1913, and quoted an expert as saying that "[1]eaving this as surplus
cemetery land from a public policy perspective doesn't make much
sense."246 Such extrinsic evidence regarding contractual terms is in-
appropriate. Since the property at issue was not yet used for buri-
als, it does not appear that this case impacts the dedication
concept.2 48 However, the court's holding creates some uncertainty
into the long-term viability of restrictive covenants and by using a
"changing character" standard, it also risks setting precedent that may
be used in the future to undermine cemetery dedications.2 4 9
237. Dumbarton Improvement Ass'n v. Druid Ridge Cemetery Co., 5 A.3d 1133
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010).
238. Id. at 1135.
239. Id. at 1138.
240. Id. at 1135.
241. Id.
242. See generally 14 Am. Jur. 2d Cemeteries §18 (2009) (stating that the owner's
intent to dedicate their land for a public cemetery coupled with public ac-
ceptance and continued use is enough to establish the dedication of land as
a cemetery).
243. Dumbarton, 5 A.3d at 1135.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1139.
246. Id.
247. See e.g., Tricat Industries, Inc. v. Harper, 748 A.2d 48 (Md. App. 2000) (not-
ing that extrinsic evidence in the interpretation of contracts is disfavored
except in situations where the contractual language is unclear).
248. Dumbarton, 5 A.3d at 1138, 1141.
249. Id. at 1140.
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In Stokes v. Jackson County Memorial Park,2 so a Mississippi appeals
court was faced with a question of whether a lien could attach to un-
platted cemetery property.251 This case originated with an automobile
accident.2 5 2 The cemetery owner was the subject of a $525,000.00 de-
fault judgment in the accident case, and when his cemetery company
went into receivership a year later, the plaintiff claimed that her judg-
ment against the owner now attached to his property (i.e., the ceme-
tery company) and that she had a lien against the cemetery.2 5s The
district court in this case found that the subject property, though not
all "officially platted or dedicated as a cemetery, [] nevertheless had
been de facto dedicated and was being held in trust by [the owner]
for the benefit of the public."254 The district court also put great
weight on the assessment of the property as tax-exempt cemetery
property.25' The property to which the plaintiff was attempting to at-
tach a lien was off-limits as it was cemetery property.256 The appellate
court partially disagreed, noting that,
that portion of [the owner's] property which has never been
officially platted and dedicated as a public cemetery has not
become a public cemetery, nor has it been impressed with a
constructive trust for the benefit of the public simply because
it has been accorded tax-exempt status. 5
This case highlights an important distinction between two types of
cemetery property: used or officially dedicated property and unused
and undedicated property (that is owned by the cemetery). 25 ' The
appellate court seemed to implicitly acknowledge that property that
has been used for burials or officially dedicated as a cemetery is insus-
ceptible to liens.259 However, the court rejects the idea that all un-
used cemetery property is dedicated and thus insusceptible of liens.2 60
Although this may be technically correct, the court does not consider
any policy ramifications of its decision.26' The primary means for a
cemetery to generate the funds necessary to sustain itself - especially
for long-term maintenance - is through the sale of burial spaces.26 2 If
a cemetery is already in receivership, it is in financial trouble and
needs all of the help it can get.26 3 By failing to recognize undevel-
250. Stokes v. Jackson County Memorial Park, 38 So.3d 668 (Miss. App. 2010).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 668.
253. Id. at 668-69.
254. Id. at 669.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 670.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 673.
260. Id. at 670.
261. See id.
262. Id. at 671.
263. Id.
Cemetery and Human Remains Legal Issues
oped land as subject to a cemetery's protection (i.e., nontaxable and
unseizable), the court has done a disservice to the public with burials
in the dedicated portion by substantially diminishing the source of
support (i.e., future burial spaces) available for the cemetery (by af-
fecting the financial support for the maintenance of existing buri-
als) .2" Hopefully, such policies will either be considered by courts in
the future or recognized by legislatures such that protection for these
areas may be instituted.
In Orla Holman Cemetery, Inc. v. Robert W Plaster Trust,2"5 the Missouri
Supreme Court considered whether to protect access to a rural ceme-
tery.2 6 6 In this case, the cemetery was owned by the county and the
access road was owned by the Village of Evergreen.2" Although the
cemetery had been used for more than 100 years, and the access road
since the 1950s, the Village enacted an ordinance to close the road in
2002 based on its allegations of "littering, loitering, poaching of cattle
and vandalism."268 Further aggravating the situation was the reality
that, although the county owned the cemetery and the road, the Vil-
lage owned all of the other surrounding property.269 With regard to
the road, although the Village argued that its police powers grant it
the authority to regulate the road, the court disagreed.27 0 Interest-
ingly, the court did not rely on the litany of law that allows reasonable
access to cemeteries as the basis for its judgment. 271 Rather, it simply
found that the county, as the owner, can control road access.2 7 2
Another matter at issue in the Orla Holman case was whether ceme-
tery visitors could use a grassy (Village-owned) area adjacent to the
cemetery for parking. For the most part, the court refused to con-
sider the issue of the parking area until trial.274 However, again, the
court did not analyze, or even mention, the existence of the general
laws providing for cemetery access. 7 Thus, it is questionable
264. Id.
265. Orla Holman Cemetery, Inc. v. Robert W. Plaster Trust, 304 S.W.3d 112
(Mo. 2010).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 114, 114-15.
268. Id. at 115.
269. Id. at 114-15.
270. Id. at 117, 117-118.
271. See, e.g., Hon. Thomas H. McVea, La. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 08-0186 (2008).
272. Orla Holman, 304 S.W.3d at 116-17. This case is not isolated, as another road
access case arose in Kentucky during the same period. In Griffin v. Union
County, No. 2010-CA-001169-MR, 2011 WL 6003889 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 2,
2011), a landowner disputed whether a particular cemetery access road was
public or private. Although the case was dismissed on other grounds, it is
apparent that the parties and the court accepted that, regardless of the
classification of the road, access to the cemetery, itself, at least for some
family members, would be mandatory. Id. at 3.
273. Orla Holman, 304 S.W.3d at 118-19.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 119-120.
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whether a decision on the merits would even be complete. 7 On the
whole, this case is not overly useful aside from noting the lack of refer-
ence to general cemetery law in the decision and some of the
problems that it can cause.27 7
In another case dealing with who has the right to control or use a
cemetery, Brennon v. Peryman Cemetery, Ltd.,"* a court found that a
cemetery's history of public accessibility impliedly dedicated it to pub-
lic use. 7 In this case, families of those buried in a historic (but still
operating) Georgia cemetery sued each other for control of the ceme-
tery.28s The court, in addition to noting that deeds referencing the
cemetery suggested that it was to be open for public use (the deeds
were created some 40 years after the first use of the cemetery), found
that the conduct of the community suggested that anyone could be
buried there and that it was not the private cemetery of the deed hold-
ers.2 8 ' This case supports the general notion that history and implica-
tion is often just as important when determining who has the right to
be buried in a cemetery as any written record.282
In In Re: Guite,28 s the Vermont Supreme Court was called upon to
decide, after the fact, whether someone could use a cemetery on his
own property.284 At the district court, the landowner argued that the
cemetery was part of his property and that he rightfully buried his
parents there.2 85 The cemetery was used by the Aldrich family since
their acquisition of the property in 1853.286 They did not transfer
ownership of the cemetery and thus contended that the current land-
owner could not make use of it simply because he owned the sur-
rounding property.2 87
The Vermont Supreme Court agreed with the Aldrichs, overturning
the district court judgment, and finding that the subject cemetery had
been specifically carved out of the 1853 sale and that it did not de-
volve with the ownership of the surrounding property. 8 In its deci-
sion, the court reviews the history of the nature of whether the 1853
deed reserved a fee interest to the Aldrichs or just a burial easement
on the cemetery property."' This distinction is important because if
276. See id.
277. Id.
278. Brennon v. Perryman Cemetery, Ltd., 709 S.E.2d 33, 36 (Ga. Ct. App.
2011).
279. Id.
280. Id. at 34.
281. Id. at 35-36.
282. Id. at 36.
283. In Re: Guite, 24 A.3d 1192 (Vt. 2011).
284. Id. at 1193.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 1193-94.
288. Id. at 1198.
289. Id. at 1195.
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all that was reserved was an easement, then the Aldrichs could bury
their dead in the cemetery, but would not own it nor could they re-
strict its use.2"o Historically, the Vermont Supreme Court had held
that "at common law the establishment of a family burial plot created
an easement against the fee." 29 1 However, in this case, the court
found a clear and explicit intent in the 1853 deed for the reservation
of the cemetery in fee to the Aldrichs."9 The court based this conclu-
sion on the specificity of the property description in the Aldrich deed:
the cemetery was specifically described by measurements and specifi-
cally exempted that measured property from the 1853 sale.29 ' This
reality is oddly complicated by a 1983 stipulation by the then-owner of
the surrounding property in a sale that mandated that the owners of
the surrounding property must maintain the cemetery.29 4 This later
requirement could certainly lead to confusion about the nature of the
cemetery's ownership and its access for public use.29 ' However, the
court rejected the notion that this agreement created any right to ac-
cess for burial on subsequent owners of the surrounding property and
also found that the current landowner's interment of his parents' re-
mains in the cemetery was done without permission or authority.29 6
The court did not go so far as to order disinterment, but the ruling
certainly leaves that possibility open on remand. 297
It is hard to say whether this case is an anomaly or the beginning of
a trend. The court in Guite takes great pains to point out how the
circumstances of this case differ so significantly from general common
law concepts of cemetery ownership and use that it is hard to envision
this case being a bellwether for the future limitation of the use of
family cemetery property. 298 However, the case certainly stands for
the proposition that real estate lawyers should carefully scrutinize the
language of any cemetery's creation evident in property transac-
tions. 9 It is possible, considering the analysis of this case, that occa-
sionally a cemetery does not transfer with the surrounding property
and that it is not always a given that subsequent owners have a right to
use a cemetery on their property.o
In Dohle v. Duffield,"o' among several property disputes between two
families was the right of one family to access their cemetery which was
290. See id.
291. Id. (citing In re: Estate of Harding, 878 A.2d 201 1 11 (Vt. 2005)).
292. Id. at 1196.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 1193-1194
295. See id. at 1194.
296. Id. at 1198.
297. See id.
298. Id. at 1195-96.
299. See id.
300. See id. at 1198.
301. Dohle v. Duffield, 396 S.W.3d 780 (Ark. App. 2012).
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wholly contained within the other family's property. Although the
Duffields owned their family cemetery, because of a foreclosure and
sale of some of their property in the 1980s, it was now completely
surrounded by Dohle land.so2 In addition to owning the cemetery,
the Duffields also owned an access road across the Dohles' property to
get to the cemetery.os However, during inclement weather, that ac-
cess road becomes impassable.30 4 Thus, in times of bad weather, the
Duffields simply crossed Dohle property at another location to reach
their cemetery. 0 '
Rather than examining the question of access to the cemetery
through the age-old right to access cemeteries for visitation and main-
tenance purposes, the parties and the court in this case looked to
whether the Duffields had acquired a right to the alternate access
route to the cemetery by way of adverse possession.so6 Although the
trial court found that the Duffields had successfully adversely pos-
sessed the alternate route to the cemetery, the appellate court dis-
agreed, finding that the Duffields' own testimony undermined this
theory.so7 It is unclear from this case why the Duffields did not simply
assert a right to access the cemetery across the Dohles' property. In
times when the usual route is impassible, it is reasonable to expect
that descendants should be provided a gratuitous right of access to
their families' graves, thus making the analysis and outcome of this
case odd. 0 s
A somewhat unique law was at issue regarding a cemetery dedica-
tion in the Texas case of Levandovsky v. Targe Resources, Inc.30 9 In this
case a one-acre family cemetery had over time become surrounded by
an industry.310 The industry sought the removal of the cemetery dedi-
cation and the relocation of the interred individuals, alleging that the
cemetery was abandoned and that visiting a cemetery in an industrial
site was unsafe for the public.3 11 The descendants challenged this ac-
tion and lost on a motion for summary judgment in the district
court.3 1' The district court found that the cemetery had been aban-
doned under the law because no one from the family knew of its exis-
tence and had not visited it in more than 30 years. 13 Because Texas
law permits the removal of a cemetery dedication by a property owner
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when the cemetery is abandoned,3 1 4 and because the family had not
visited the cemetery, the district court ruled that the cemetery could
be moved."'
In this case, the appellate court noted that the cemetery did not
meet the definition of an abandoned cemetery,' 16 and thus the indus-
trial landowner could not avail itself of the law allowing for the re-
moval of the cemetery's dedication as an abandoned cemetery.11 7
Ironically enough, under a regulation that defines abandoned ceme-
teries, it was the industry's own actions that kept the cemetery from
being abandoned."' Under 13 Tex. Admin. Code § 22.1, to be aban-
doned, a cemetery must: "(1) contain one or more graves; (2) ha[ve]
cemetery elements for which no cemetery organization exists; and (3)
is not otherwise maintained by any caretakers.""' In this case, the
record reflected that the industry had maintained the cemetery for
many years, thus defeating its own claim that the cemetery was
abandoned.3 2 0
It is clear that this regulation saved this particular cemetery from
relocation. 321 Although, from a historic preservation perspective, it is
a bit troubling that a cemetery can so easily be undedicated in Texas
(i.e., it seems to be left up to the discretion of the landowner, with
little or no consideration given to the integrity of the historical record
or to the proscription against exhumation), it does appear that the
industry in this case was going to appropriately accomplish the disin-
terments." It is doubtful that this scenario will often repeat itself, as
such cemeteries are seldom cared for. 2
Cemetery access was also at issue in the case of Prewitt v. Teny.324
This case involved a rural cemetery on private property to which the
members of a cemetery association were being denied access.3 2 ' The
access being denied was not by the landowner on whose property the
cemetery was situated, but rather an adjacent landowner across whose
property it was apparently easier to pass through in order to reach the
314. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY. CODE ANN. § 711.010(b) (West 2013).
315. Levandovsky, 375 S.W.3d at 596.
316. Id. at 597-98
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 597 (emphasis added).
320. Id. at 595.
321. Id.
322. See id. at 595-97 (Cemetery was only incidentally saved from disinternment
by landowner and not families' continued upkeep of the grave sites).
323. See generally, Oak Grove Cemetary: Bones and Caskets Popping out at Iowa Grave-
yards (Video and Photos), HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.huf-
fingtonpost.com/2011/10/20/oak-grove-cemetaryn_1022017.html.
(Caretakers discuss an inability to maintain gravesites that have been dis-
turbed or destroyed due to time or environment, because of cumbersome
state protocol requiring finding next of kin.)
324. Prewitt v. Terry, 2012 WL 4052135 (Tx. App. Austin 2012).
325. See id. at *1.
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cemetery.32' The court in this case did not analyze any of the allega-
tions with respect to the general maxim that access to isolated ceme-
teries for maintenance and visitation must be permitted (within
reason). 2 It is unclear whether the court did not consider this the-
ory because the plaintiffs did not raise it or because the court deter-
mined the principle inapplicable. More likely, it is the former, as it
appears that the plaintiffs were asserting access rights via title or vari-
ous implicit easement theories.3 2' The court rejected each of the title
and easement theories based on a lack of evidence.32'I Had the court
reached the cemetery right of access issue, it should have found that
such a principle was inapplicable.3 3 o That principle does not permit
passage over anyone's property to reach a cemetery, but rather only
across the cemetery owner's property.33 ' Because the defendant in
this matter was not the owner of the cemetery property, the imposi-
tion of such a burden on him would likely be unreasonable. 3 Be-
cause the ruling in this case was interlocutory, it is possible that this
issue will arise in the future and, should that occur, the court should
reject this theory of access.
In Richardson v. Bd. of Commissioners of Owen County,334 Owen County
in Indiana was sued by family members alleging that they were injured
by the County's failure to maintain a road that accessed a cemetery, as
such lack of maintenance made it more difficult for them to visit their
daughter's grave.33' Because the trial court found that several other
access routes were available, it did not find that the family was ag-
grieved under the law and thus lacked standing to challenge the
County's abandonment of the road.' The appellate court agreed.
In addition, the appellate court found that the County had actually
abandoned the subject road for at least 30 years and that the family
could not articulate a cause of action to force the County to reassume
maintenance of the abandoned road.3" The court put no small
amount of emphasis on the family's ability to access (and, in fact, the
reality that they were accessing) the cemetery by alternate means.33 9
326. Id.
327. Id. at *2-5.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. See generally, Dohle v. Duffield, 2012 Ark. App. 217 (Ark. Ct. App.2012).
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2012), transfer denied 977 N.E.2d 353 (Ind. 2012).
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C. Perpetual care and merchandise issues
In addition to the more disturbing cemetery and human remains
cases discussed herein, cemeteries also encompass aspects of financial
matters when it comes to the regulation and protection of cemeteries'
perpetual care and merchandise trust funds. Although somewhat un-
related to the land use and tort issues in this paper, these cases are
nonetheless important and are reviewed as part of the broader treat-
ment of cemetery law.
In Man-Hung Lee v. Hartsdale Canine Cemetery, Inc.,34 0 a small claims
court in New York was called upon to sort out a dispute in which a pet
owner sued the cemetery where her dog was interred for wrongful
disinterment and cremation and was then countersued by the ceme-
tery for breach of contract for failure to pay upkeep fees to the ceme-
tery.34 ' In the arrangements for the dog's burial, the owner opted for
annual care payments over a perpetual care payment.34 2 Four years'
worth of invoices for annual care went unpaid, despite written warn-
ings that nonpayment would result in disinterment.343 Following
these notices, absent payment, the dog was disinterred and cre-
mated.344 From a legal standpoint, the court looked to whether the
cemetery had adhered to the notice requirements of the law by prop-
erly notifying the owner of the annual care/perpetual care options at
the time the arrangements were made and the ramifications of failing
to pay for annual care. 45 The court found that the notice provided
was adequate. 4 6 In this case, the court relied heavily on the language
in the contract executed by the owner, which referred to "annual gen-
eral care" at annual costs.347
Of further interest was the court's refusal to recognize the ceme-
tery's continued upkeep of the grave space and monument in the ab-
sence of payment as an implied conversion of annual care to
perpetual care such that the nonpayment could not result in disinter-
ment.348 In this regard, although some language in the contract sup-
ported the reality that a grave space right holder may obtain some
perpetual interest in the space by maintaining a marker thereon, the
court deferred to the cemetery's general rules (by which the contract
required annual care to get any perpetual benefits).4 In other
340. Man-Hung Lee v. Harsdale Canine Cementary, Inc., 899 N.Y.S. 2d 823
(White Plains City Court 2010).
341. Id. at 824.
342. Id. at 826.
343. Id. at 827.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 830.
346. Id. at 831.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 831-32.
349. Id. at 834.
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words, "perpetual" lasted only as long as annual care payments were
made.sso
Perhaps most important about this case is the fact that the court
placed the burden on the owner to prove that the cemetery had been
notified of her change in address. 51 In other words, the court did
not require the cemetery to undertake any investigation into why the
payments had not been made, but rather placed the burden on the
owner to ensure that she was being properly billed for her annual
care. 3 " Accordingly, the court refused to find that the cemetery
wrongfully disinterred the dog and it found that the owner breached
the contract by failing to pay her annual care fees. 53 Although inter-
esting, it is doubtful that such conduct by a cemetery (i.e., disinter-
ment) would be taken in stride by a court when the remains are
human rather than canine, based on courts' general disfavor for
exhumation.354
In Foshee v. Forethought Federal Savings Bank,"' the court was
presented with questions regarding obligations of perpetual care trust-
ees.' In this case, the trustee used perpetual care funds to purchase
life insurance policies on the perpetual care policy holders from its
subsidiary without the consent of the perpetual care policy holders. 5
The actual decision reviewed here is simply a decision on a motion to
dismiss and not a decision on the merits.3 58
The policy holders in this case alleged that they were injured by a
breach of a fiduciary duty through the bank's unauthorized use of
their perpetual care trust funds.35' The bank countered by stating that
the policy holders neither "sought any services based on their" poli-
cies, nor had the policy holders shown that the trust contained inade-
quate funds to cover its obligations. 6 o
The court noted that the bank's positions that no services were re-
quested and no showing of inadequate funding was made were mis-
placed because the policy holders were not suing for a breach of
contract (the cause of action implied by the bank's defenses), but
rather that the unauthorized "alleged mismanagement and resulting
350. See id. at 832.
351. Id. at 833.
352. See id. at 833-34.
353. Id. at 834.
354. See e.g., Choppin v. Labranche, 20 So. 681, 682 (La. 1896) (discouraging the
disturbance of the dead except for "lawful necessary purposes"); T. ScoT-r
GILLIGAN & THOMAs F.H. STUEVE, MORTUARY LAw 49-53 (9th ed., 2005)
(1940) (noting that disinterment is generally disfavored).
355. Foshee v. Forethought Federal Say. Bank, No. 09-2674-JPM-DKV, 2010 WL
2650733 (W.D. Tenn. July 1, 2010).
356. Id.
357. Id. at *2.
358. Id.
359. Id. at *5.
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depletion of the trust corpus were claims of a breach of fiduciary
duty to the policy holders and claims of breaches of state preneed
law.36 2 Ultimately, the court sided with the policy holders, noting that
the unauthorized use of the perpetual care funds had nothing to do
with whether the policy holders' contracts could or would be
honored.63 Because the claims were clearly related to a breach of
fiduciary duty and a breach of state law the court held that the suit
could go forward regardless of whether the policy holders could actu-
ally be made whole as to their contract terms.
Despite the fact that the case is only a decision on a preliminary
matter, it is important for cemetery regulators.36" This is because it
reaffirms the primacy of perpetual care laws and fiduciary obligations
over contract agreements and whether a cemetery can actually per-
form or has actually performed on its contractual obligations to the
consumers.16  Rather, compliance with the perpetual care laws is
mandatory and while a cemetery can avoid contract liability by making
good on its obligations to consumers, it must avoid running afoul of
regulatory provisions to be in good standing from a regulatory stand-
point (and possibly free from criminal and civil liability for regulatory
breach).3
In Midwest Memorial Group, LLC v. International Fund Services (Ire-
land), Ltd., 68 a New York federal court was faced with the question of
how long the statute of limitations for the recovery of mismanaged
cemetery trust funds was. 3 6 9 This case presented an exceptional set of
circumstances whereby several people conspired to defraud a ceme-
tery's trust fund.37 0 Although this case was brought in New York, it
involved a cemetery in Michigan. Upon institution of a conserva-
torship over the cemetery, Michigan regulators indentified $60 mil-
lion in unaccounted-for cemetery trust funds. In this case, the third
party purchaser of the cemetery from the Michigan conservator at-
tempted to recover the missing funds.372 The New York suit arose
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In this case, the New York defendant attempted to cover up its ac-
quisition of some of the misappropriated funds substantially later than
the time of the alleged misappropriations. 7 4 Hoping to take advan-
tage of this later date to avoid the tolling of prescription, the plaintiff/
purchaser argued that its ability to recover its share of the funds
should run from the time of the cover up.375 The court disagreed,
finding that any claim for the misappropriated funds related back to
the actual conversion of the funds, not the concealment.376
It is difficult to tell whether this case is a bellwether for other trust
fund misappropriation cases because of its unique fact scenario. How-
ever, it certainly supports the notion that acting fast to recover misap-
propriated trust funds is essential. 7
In Savannah Cemetery Group, Inc. v. Depue-Wilbert Vault Co.,3 7 s a Geor-
gia appellate court affirmed a lower court's finding that a private cem-
etery's restriction on the use of concrete vaults constituted a violation
of the state's cemetery laws and unreasonably interfered with third
party contracts.379 In this case, the court acknowledged that Georgia's
cemetery law allowed cemeteries "to establish reasonable rules and
regulations regarding the type, material, design, composition, finish,
and specifications of any and all merchandise to be used or installed
in the cemetery."38 0 However, because the complained-of rule imme-
diately banned the use of concrete vaults in the cemetery at issue, the
court found that the rule was not reasonable as an undue burden on
consumers and other businesses that had already contracted for such
vaults.s 1 The court in this case also refused to defer to the private
cemetery's rule simply because the cemetery could point to some rea-
sons for implementing it.3 8 2
In addition to the interference with contract theory that the court
used to strike down this private cemetery's rule, the court also found
that the pro-consumer policies of the state cemetery law were violated
by the rule because it "effectively den [ied] consumers the freedom to
make decisions about burial vault materials."3 8 3 This is a particularly
interesting holding, as it seems to suggest that such a rule is approach-
ing an anticompetitive restriction.
374. Id. at *3.
375. Id.
376. Id. at *4.
377. See id.
378. Savannah Cemetery Group, Inc. v. Depue-Wilbert Vault Co.,704 S.E. 2d 858
(Ga. App. 2010).
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This case could be fairly important because it not only limits a cem-
etery from imposing merchandise rules that impact existing contracts,
but it also restricts rules that limit consumers' choices."8 In this case,
those choices involved the vault building materials. 8 However, it is
conceivable that this case could stand for the proposition that con-
sumer choice should be favored over private property owners' limita-
tions on the use of their own property in other merchandise
contexts.' 8 The case is further important as it illustrates that such
activity need not be brought by the government or a regulatory en-
tity.' In this case, it was impacted merchandise providers who
brought the action to protect their own businesses, thus standing for
the proposition that even private parties may use cemetery consumer
protection laws to protect themselves and the public at large and they
need not always wait for the government to act.38 9
Other recent important merchandise cases are represented here by
three decisions from the same case: St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille.9 o The
St. Joseph Abbey cases deal with the question of whether Louisiana's laws
restricting the sale of caskets to licensed funeral directors is constitu-
tional."' The original suit was brought by a group of monks who
wanted to make simple wooden caskets to sell to support their monas-
tery. 92 Under the existing Louisiana law, for the monks to do this,
they would have to become licensed funeral directors and the monas-
tery would have to be a funeral home.39 3
The first of the rulings in this case was on a motion to dismiss the
monks' suit by the Louisiana State Board of Embalmers and Funeral
Directors (the "Embalmers Board") ." The court denied this motion,
finding that the monks did have a legitimate legal question, thus al-
lowing the suit to proceed.9
The second ruling was the actual substance of the decision at the
district court.396 In this case, the federal court in New Orleans struck
down the law, finding such a protectionist restriction on casket sales
to be "in contravention of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the United States Constitution."" The court recog-
385. Id. at 867.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 862-63.
388. Id. at 858-59.
389. Id. at 861.
390. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, No. 10-2717, 2011 WL 1361425, at *1 (E.D. La.
4/8/11); St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 835 F. .Supp.2d 149, 149-50 (E.D. La.
2011), appeal filed, 700 F.3d 154 (5th Cir. 2012).
391. Castille, 2011 WL 1361425, at *1.
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396. St. Joseph Abbey, 835 F.Supp.2d at 149-50.
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nized that consumer protection and the protection of health and
safety is a legitimate government purpose.3 9 8 However, and impor-
tantly for this review, the court did not find any public health or safety
basis for the law requiring a funeral directors' license to sell caskets. 9
The court also found no rational relationship between the stated
goals of the law and the means for accomplishing those goals.40 0 In
other words, although there may be unique aspects to the casket sale
industry, the court could not find any reason that someone needed to
be a licensed funeral director to figure out those issues.4 0 '
At the time of this writing, this case has yet to be resolved.4 02 In
2012, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a ruling
in this case.40 3 Although the court indicated its likelihood of agreeing
with the district court's decision regarding the validity of the Louisi-
ana casket sale restriction,4 04 it declined to definitively speak to the
constitutionality of the challenged law absent the resolution of a
threshold issue by the Louisiana Supreme Court.4 0 s The threshold
issue, identified for the first time by the Fifth Circuit during this ap-
peal, was the question of whether the Embalmers Board even has au-
thority to regulate casket sales by anyone other than funeral directors
in the first instance.40 6 In other words, the court noticed that the en-
tire case under review assumes that the Legislature provided the Em-
balmers Board with the authority to regulate casket sales; whereas the
law authorizing the Embalmers Board only appears to provide that
body with the authority to regulate funeral directors, funeral homes,
and embalmers - not sales of any kind that are not undertaken by
these entities.40 Thus, if the Embalmers Board has no authority to
regulate casket sales by those other than funeral directors, funeral
homes, and embalmers, there is no one to enforce the challenged law
398. Id. at 156.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 158-59.
401. Id. at 160.
402. See generally, St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 700 F.3d 154, 155 (5th Cir. 2012)
(the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the question at issue was one
of state law and certified the question to the Louisana Supreme Court for
determination); See also St. Joseph Abbey v. Castilee, 106 So. 3d 542, 543
(La. 2013) (the Louisana Supreme Court declined to rule on the certified
question; See also, St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2013)
(the Fifth Circuit upheld District Court's ruling); cert. denied, 82 U.S.L.W.
3214 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2013) (No. 13-91).
403. St. Joseph Abbey, 700 F.3d 154 (5th Cir. 2012).
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ering the "legitimate purposes" for the challenged law put forth by the Em-
balmers Board, that, "[t]he great deference due state economic regulation
does not demand judicial blindness to the history of a challenged rule or
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explanations for naked transfers of wealth." Id. at 165.
405. Id. at 167-68.
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and a constitutional determination need not be made.408 Finding
that the question of the scope of the Embalmers Board's authority was
one of state law, the Fifth Circuit certified the question to the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court for determination."0 ' That court declined to rule
on the certified question." 0
A somewhat divergent decision on the constitutionality of a funeral
board's regulation was reached in the Kentucky case of Reynolds Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Kentucky Bd. of Embalmers and Funeral Directors.4 1' In this
case, the plaintiff operated a crematory and it was cited and fined
when it was found that it had transported a deceased's body to its
cremation facility.4 12 Kentucky law allows for the transportation of
human remains only by licensed funeral directors 13 or, under some
circumstances, by others with a coroner's permission. 14 The plaintiff
in this case had neither.41
Because the plaintiff believed that the inability to transport dead
bodies affected its business, it challenged the constitutionality of the
transport restrictions. 4 16 The plaintiff alleged that the restrictions vio-
lated its due process and equal protection rights.417 Unlike in the St.
Joseph Abbey cases, discussed supra, the Kentucky courts did not find
that there were any constitutional problems with limiting the trans-
portation of human remains to funeral directors.418 This case was one
of economic concerns, thus the challenged laws were afforded only
the rational basis scrutiny as to whether they constituted infringe-
ments on the plaintiffs rights.4 19 The courts in this case found the
concerns regarding the public health hazards and the additional
training required of funeral directors to be a rational basis upon
which to treat crematoria differently and refused to find that the chal-
lenged laws were unconstitutional.420
Taken together, the St. Joseph Abbey cases and this case seem to stand
for the proposition that even the slightest legitimate public health
concern will overcome constitutional challenges that restrict certain
activities concerning the dead.4 2 1 Itjust happened that no real public
408. Id.
409. Id. at 168-69.
410. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 106 So.3d 542 (La. 2013).
411. Reynolds Enterprises, Inc. v. Kentucky Bd. Of Embalmers and Funeral Di-
rectors, 382 S.W.3d 47 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).
412. Id. at 49.
413. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 316.010(5) (LexisNexis 2013).
414. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §213.081(1) (LexisNexis 2013).
415. Reynolds Enterprises, Inc., 382 S.W.3d at 49.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 50.; see supra note 403 and accompanying text.
419. Reynolds Enterprises, Inc., 382 S.W.3d at 50.
420. Id. at 50-51.
421. See supra notes 404-05, 426 and accompanying text.
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health risk could reasonably be articulated in the St. Joseph Abbey
case. 4 22
Perpetual care obligations and general contract and tort theories
were at the heart of the recent Indiana appellate case of Barrett v. City
of Logansport.42 8 In that case, a family sued the city-operated cemetery
under numerous theories when maintenance activities on a neighbor-
ing plot allegedly caused their son's grave to retain rainwater, making
it, "mushy and gooshy."4 24 In this case, the decedent's family claimed
that the cemetery's allowing an adjacent grave space owner to bring in
fill dirt to beautify and stabilize his family plot caused a change in
drainage patterns that caused their son's grave to pool water.4 25 One
theory of recovery was that the cemetery's guarantee of perpetual care
extended to ensuring proper drainage.42' Both the district and appel-
late courts rejected this theory without substantial discussion.4 27 This
lack of analysis is disappointing, but, in rejecting the plaintiffs' motion
for summary judgment, it is apparent that the trial court accepted and
the appellate court affirmed, the cemetery's testimony that, "the term
'perpetual care' as used in the cemetery ordinance did not include
keeping a gravesite well-drained."42 1
In addition to the perpetual care claim (which was styled as a
breach of contract claim), the plaintiffs alleged that they were victims
of fraud or constructive fraud by being enticed to purchase a plot pur-
portedly under the promise that the grave space would never flood.42 9
The courts rejected these claims, noting that both require "misrepre-
sentation of past or existing facts."4s0 However, because the fill mate-
rial was added after the plaintiffs' purchase, the courts correctly
observed that the plaintiffs would have,
to establish that, at the time the parties entered into the bur-
ial agreement. . ., [that the City] could have predicted that a
nearby grave owner would coordinate with the Cemetery for
improvements and, as a consequence of those potential fu-
ture improvements, the [plaintiffs] would somehow become
disgruntled or damaged.'
The speculative and future nature of this possibility at the time of the
sale of the grave space made the fraud claims untenable. 43 2
422. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 835 F. Supp. 2d 149, 158-59 (E.D. La. 201
423. Barrett v. City of Logansport, No. 09AO2-1103-PL-252, (Ind. App. Jan. 11,
2011) (WestLaw, 961 N.E.2d 70), transfer denied 978 N.E.2d 416 (Ind. 2012).
424. Id. at *1-2.
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430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Id. at *8-9.
Cemetery and Human Remains Legal Issues
Finally, the plaintiffs alleged negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress.433 However, citing the general nonapplicability of mental
anguish claims to grave space problems, the courts also rejected this
claim.4 84
This case is fairly consistent with the others in terms of the NIED
claims and the fraud claim. It is unfortunate that the court did not
analyze the perpetual care claim, as that would have been informative.
It is also unfortunate that the court did not address one further mat-
ter in this case. The plaintiffs sought to have an expert visit the grave
site just prior to the trial, but were rebuffed by the trial court.4 3' The
plaintiffs argued that, because the cemetery was open to the public,
the expert should have been free to visit the grave.4 86 Rather than
examining this interesting and important issue of cemetery access, the
court focused on whether discovery on the eve of trial was appropri-
ate, thus, again, leaving a significant cemetery law matter
unaddressed.4 3 7
D. Regulatory Issues & Regulatory Liability
The financial aspects of cemetery problems merge into the regula-
tory challenges related to these special places.4 38 In that regard, there
have been several recent instructive cases covering both regulatory is-
sues as well as possible liability concerns for cemetery regulators.3
In Mount Vernon Cemetery Co. v. Pennsylvania Dept. of State,440 the issue
was whether a cemetery that had been in existence since 1856 and had
not sold grave spaces since 1969 had been in violation of the Real
Estate Licensing and Registration Act and the Burial Grounds Act for
failing to be a registered cemetery since 1982.441 An administrative
hearing officer had found that such a violation had occurred because
the cemetery had still conducted "cemetery business" in violation of
the law.44 The "cemetery business" that the cemetery was found to
have conducted was the interment of remains and cremains in grave
spaces that had been sold prior to 1969.448 On appeal, because the
cemetery had not sold grave spaces since 1969, the appellate court
held that the cemetery was not required to be licensed. 4
433. Id. at *14.
434. Id. at 15.
435. Id. at *9-10.
436. Id. at *4.
437. Id. at *10.
438. See Barrett v. City of Logansport, 961 N.E.2d 70 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans-
fer denied, 978 N.E.2d 416 (Ind. 2012).
439. Id. at 15.
440. See Smith Barney v. Stonemor Operating, LLC, 55 A.3d 1274 (Pa.comm.Ct.
2012).
441. Id. at 1275-76.
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 1276-1277.
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This case is one of statutory interpretation that examines what is
meant by the term "cemetery company."4 4 5 Because the definition of
that term under Pennsylvania law uses present tense verbs, the court
held that the cemetery must be currently selling or offering grave
spaces for sale to qualify as a cemetery company.4 4 6 States with word-
ing in their laws similar to that in Pennsylvania's should take heed of
this decision.
In Smith Barney v. Stonemor Operating, LLC,4 4 7 a mortuary was placed
into a receivership at the request of a regulatory body.448 The basis
for the receivership was the alleged misappropriation of millions of
dollars in trust fund money.4 4 9 Upon acquiring control, the receiver
sued Smith Barney, "alleging that it had participated in the plunder-
ing of the trust funds."4 5 0 Smith Barney attempted to defend the suit
by arguing that its contractual relationship with the mortuary con-
tained a mandatory arbitration clause4 5 1 and that the receiver could
not access the courts without exercising the arbitration clause.4 52
In this case, although the receiver was now operating the mortuary,
the court refused to impute the mortuary's contractual agreements
with Smith Barney to the receiver. 45 Thus, with no contractual privity
between Smith Barney and the receiver, the receiver was not bound to
arbitrate disputes with Smith Barney and could proceed directly to
court.45 4 This result resembles certain authority granted to a trustee
and to the court in bankruptcy proceedings in that it seeks to maxi-
mize the authority of the entity charged with restoring the mortuary
and to unencumber the receiver from bad or questionable decisions
that are now problematic. 45 5 This case should be useful in future
cases questioning regulatorily-installed receivers' powers and limita-
tions to control and restore beleaguered cemeteries.4 5 6
445. Id. at 1276.
446. Id. at 1277-78.
447. Smith Barney v. Stonemor Operating, LLC, 959 N.E.2d 309 (Ind. Ct. App.
2011) (this case was a rehearing of the matter that was originally reported
at 953 N.E.2d 554 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), and reached the same result); trans-
fer denied 967 N.E.2d 1036 (Ind. 2012), and cert. denied, Citigroup Global
Markets Inc. v. StoneMor Operating LLC, 133 S. Ct. 758, 184 L. Ed. 2d 499
(U.S. 2012). A more comprehensive factual recitation of this situation exists
in Gray v. Bush, 628 F. 3d 779 (6th Cir. 2010). Because this case deals with
largely procedural matters, it is mentioned in the interest of completeness
and for a factual background to the Smith Barney case.
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In Enos v. State of Hawaii,4 5 7 a descendant claimed that two state
agencies were negligent and liable to her for erroneously issuing a
disinterment permit.458 In this case, the plaintiff claimed that the per-
mit was issued without compliance with the state's burial laws and con-
tributed to her claims of emotional distress at the disinterment of her
grandmother.4 5 9 The court in this case rejected the plaintiffs claims
against the agencies, noting that the state's general tort liability act
barred such claims when remedies were available elsewhere in the
law.460 Here, the "elsewhere" was the state burial law, which provided
the plaintiff with the authority to stop the disinterment through in-
junctive relief, which she did not do (although she did have ample
notice of the disinterment).461 In other words, the court found that
the State of Hawai'i had not waived its sovereign immunity and had
consented to be sued for money damages for erroneous issuances of
disinterment permits.462 Instead, the only available relief is to seek
injunctive relief against the disinterment.4 63 Importantly, the court
did note that it did not intend for this ruling to apply to situations
where advance notice of disinterment did not exist. 4 6 4
The Enos case is important because it generally supports the notion
that government actors may make mistakes based on bad information,
but that the public should not be responsible for those errors. 6 ' This
case represents jurisprudential support for a shield to regulatory liabil-
ity for state agencies.466
In Palmore v. City of Pacific,4 67 a plaintiff brought claims against both
public and private defendants seeking damages for alleged violations
of local ordinances related to burial procedures, for allegations that
the City refused access to cemetery records, and for refusing to allow
him to speak at an open meeting. 68
This memorandum ruling by the court only considers the claims
against the governmental defendants. 4 69 The claims against the City
were brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the City had violated
457. Enos v. State Dep't of Land & Natural Res., No. 28125 (Haw. App. July 26,
2010) (Westlaw).
458. Id. at *1.
459. Id.
460. Id. at *5.
461. Id. at *4-5.
462. Id. at *3.
463. Id. at *5.
464. Id. at *4. The court did not foreclose the same result in those situations,
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several of the plaintiffs constitutional rights.4 7 0 The alleged constitu-
tional violations in this matter were due process, equal protection,
and First Amendment violations.4 7 1 With regard to the City's liability
for alleged torts (for which the plaintiff claimed damages for constitu-
tional violations), the court noted that a municipality is not liable
merely because it "employs the alleged tort-feasor."4 72 The court fur-
ther noted that, in order for a question of a municipality's liability to
even be considered under 42 U.S.C. 1983, there must first be a finding
of unconstitutional acts by the municipal employee and 42 U.S.C.
1983 must not attach for employee negligence.47 3 In order to make
even an intentional violation attach liability to the municipality, an
isolated incident does not cause liability to attach to a municipality. 4 7 4
Instead, for liability to attach, there must be a showing that the "al-
leged misconduct was so persistent among the rank-and-file employ-
ees of the municipality as to constitute a "custom" with the "force of
law."475 There also must be a showing that "alleged misconduct must
be 'pervasive constitutional violations'; thus, liability for an unconsti-
tutional custom or practice cannot arise from a single act. "476
In this case, the court found that the due process allegations (i.e.,
that the City engaged in efforts "to 'silence' him" regarding his allega-
tion of failure to adhere to the burial laws), were insufficient to sup-
port a cause of action against the municipality.4 7 7 Basically, the court
found that although the plaintiff had to jump through a few hoops to
gain access to the cemetery and the cemetery records, these hoops
constituted mere "inconveniences" that did not rise to the level of
constitutional violations.
The court similarly found no equal protection problem.4 79 The
court simply found that the plaintiff failed to show that he had been
treated differently than any other citizen.4"o
The First Amendment claim revolved around whether the plaintiffs
public comments at a public meeting were limited to 5 minutes be-
cause he was an outspoken critic of the City. 481' The court recognized
that, although allegations of First Amendment violations are at the
core of 42 U.S.C. 1983 actions,4 8 2 these allegations may be tempered
470. Id. at 1166.
471. Id.
472. Id. at 1174.
473. Id.
474. Id. at 1174-75.
475. Id. at 1175.
476. Id.
477. Id. at 1169.
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481. Id.
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by a government's reasonable time, place, and manner limitations.
The court found that the time limit was, "at best . . .a de minimus
injury,484 and that the plaintiffs ability to raise his criticisms was not
violated.48
Based upon the above findings and the limitation of liability for mu-
nicipalities under 42 U.S.C. 1983 actions,48 6 this is an important case
for public bodies and regulators, as it reaffirms the limited liability of
these entities for monetary damages and the general allowance for
such entities to reasonably conduct their meetings without having to
suffer a meeting hijacking by disgruntled citizens.
In another case examining regulatory liability, Grayson v. Pacesetter
Capital Group,48 a case arising out of the Burr Oak Cemetery scandal
in Illinois, " the plaintiffs named the Village of Alsip as a defendant
on allegations that the Village should have indentified the Burr Oak
problem long before it came to light.49 0 Basically, the plaintiffs al-
leged that the Village's purported or constructive knowledge of the
Burr Oak problems without stopping the problems constituted "aid-
ing and abetting and.. .civil conspiracy with the Burr Oak defendants
in the suit."491
The alleged knowledge of the Village arose from several complaints
to the police "over a 10-year period in which Alsip police were told
about allegedly suspicious activity at the cemetery."49 2 Based upon
these complaints, the plaintiffs alleged that the Village knew about the
broader Burr Oak scheme and were involved in and profiting from
the scheme. 9 The court noted that " [t] he alternative explanation is
that Alsip police, despite receiving a few possible clues, never became
aware of the scheme, never quite connected the dots from these re-
ports."494 The court found that the plaintiffs' allegations against the
Village were simply too vague and speculative to support a "larger con-
clusion that Alsip police were involved in [a] massive criminal scheme
483. Id.
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over a long period of time."4 9 5 The court also recognized that con-
tract law held municipalities free from liability for a "failure to supply
general police or fire protection."4 9 6 The court thus dismissed the
claims against the Village.
This case is also a potentially important one for regulatory entities.
Vague complaints of cemetery-related wrongdoing are common.498
However, when these complaints lack specific information to support
the claim of wrongdoing, knowledge of the complaints does not im-
pute liability or collusion to a regulatory entity when it fails to take
action on vague or unsupported complaints.4 9 9 In addition, this case
also raises the likelihood that general limitation of liability statutes for
failure to provide enforcement should also apply to failure to regulate
claims against regulatory entities.o
In City of Tarpon Springs v. Planes,"o' a family bought multiple spaces
in a City-owned cemetery, and agreed to be bound by the cemetery's
rules. 0 2 Subsequent to their purchase, the family changed their bur-
ial plans and sought a variance from the City's rules for the cemetery
in order to accommodate their new plans.os The City denied the
family's request and the family sued the City, seeking an order and
mandamus commanding the City to participate in dispute resolution
regarding the variance denial.' Because both the City's decision not
to participate in arbitration and the City's decision not to grant the
variance were both discretionary duties, the court found that manda-
mus was not an available remedy to the family. 05
The utility of this case is somewhat limited. However, it does stand
for the notion that government-run cemeteries' decisions not to devi-
ate from their rules are not likely actionable. 06
Another court also addressed the liability of a municipality in tort
for problems stemming from the operation of its cemetery. 0 7 In
Thompson v. Germantown Cemetery, the municipal cemetery mistakenly
sold two plots to two different partieso.50  The problem was not recog-
nized until after the interment of the second purchasers of the
spaces.509 The first purchaser demanded disinterment of the second
495. Id. at *14-15.
496. Id. at *10.
497. Id. at *25-26.
498. See id. at *3.
499. Id. at *3, *8.
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purchasers and brought an action against the municipality for dam-
ages resulting from negligence, breach of contract, and emotional
distress. 1 o
The court was required, in this case, to determine whether any of
the damages alleged occurred as a result of mere negligence or
whether they were intentional and with malice.5 1 Under Ohio law, it
is only the latter from which a municipality is not immune.5 1' The
Court determined that the municipality's actions were not intentional
and thus that it was immune from the negligence claims.5 13 However,
the municipality was not immune from the breach of contract
claims.5 1' The court refused to address whether the breach encom-
passed emotional distress, as that was not before it in this matter. 15
In another case, Foshee v. Forethought Federal Savings Bank case,5 16 a
Tennessee federal court stayed a federal suit in the large preneed
fraud lawsuit already discussed under the Burford Abstention Doc-
trine.5' The basics of this matter are that individuals who had been
defrauded in a widespread trust fund scheme associated with several
cemeteries sought recompense from financial institutions that held
some of those funds.5"' The receiver appointed to manage those cem-
eteries had ongoing suits under the Tennessee Cemetery regulatory
scheme in state court and sought federal court abstention on the pri-
vate claims until the state action was complete. 19
Finding that the Burford elements were met, based largely on the
state's comprehensive regulatory scheme for cemeteries, the federal
court granted the receiver's request and stayed the federal claims
pending a completion of the state proceedings.5 2 0 The probable util-
ity of this case for the regulatory community is that it may support
staying or remanding cemetery cases in federal court to let a state reg-
ulatory scheme run its course in administrative proceedings or state
court actions before or in lieu of federal court jurisdiction.5 1' Fur-
ther, the case reaffirms, at least implicitly, the primacy of receivership
proceedings to protection of cemeteries in general over individual
claims of descendants. 5 2 2
510. Id.
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In the case City of Boerne v. Vaughan, 23 the City of Boerne appealed
a decision finding that it was not immune from suit in a cemetery
case.12 1 In this case, the original plaintiff alleged that the City,
through its agent, Vaughan, had sold her a plot for the interment of
her husband that was already sold to another person.2 Upon realiz-
ing its error, eight years after the interment of the plaintiffs husband,
the City, again through its agent, disinterred and moved the deceased
to another space in the cemetery.2 The plaintiff sued the agent and
the City for breach of contract and for damages.52 7
The City claimed that it was immune from suit in this matter even
though it readily admitted that it provided the erroneous information
that led to the interment in the wrong place.5 2 ' The trial court re-
fused the City's plea of immunity. 52 On appeal, although it was clear
that the appellate court did not like its own decision for reasons of
equity,53s it found that the Texas Legislature had clearly provided for:
(1) immunity for municipalities exercising governmental functions;5 3 1
and (2) cemetery operations to be classified as a governmental func-
tion.53 2 Thus, although the City was the cause of the problem in this
case, it was found to be immune.
It is unclear in this ruling whether the City's agent will be able to
avail himself of the City's immunity, but it seems unlikely (because the
court at least tangentially addressed this issue in passing). It is also
unclear how applicable the immunity found in this case will be
outside of Texas. 35 The answer to this question will vary from state to
state depending on statutory immunity in each jurisdiction.5 3 1
The recent case of Range v. Douglas"' is perhaps the most shocking
of the cases reviewed here. This case largely deals with regulator lia-
bility and immunity.' The Range case arises from a morgue attend-
ant's convictions for having sex with at least three dead bodies during
his 14-year tenure with the Hamilton County (OH) Coroner's Of-
fice.5 3 ' This case deals with the liability, under federal and state law,
523. City of Boerne v. Vaughan, 2012 WL 2839889 (Tx.Ct.App., San Antonio
2012).
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of the county and its agents and employees (not including the con-
victed individual) in their official and individual capacities for the
shocking acts of Mr. Douglas. 4 o
Under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the families of the deceased assert that their
constitutional rights were violated by the county.5 4 1 The plaintiffs
raise two substantive due process theories in this case. First, they as-
sert that the county had a duty to protect the corpses of their loved
ones. 54 2 Second, the plaintiffs allege that the fact that Douglas' acts
"shock the conscience" gives rise to a substantive due process cause of
action.543
Because the court found that the alleged duty to protect was one
that arose under state law and because it found that the United States
Supreme Court had held that substantive due process cannot supplant
state tort theories of recovery, it found no constitutional duty to sup-
port the plaintiffs' claims.54 4 With respect to the "shocking" substan-
tive due process theory, the court found that "[t]he act of having sex
with a dead body is certainly shocking conduct."54 5 However, the
court also found that, to support this substantive due process theory,
because the county did not do the shocking thing, it must have been
foreseeable to the county's supervisory employees that Douglas would
do such acts and that their failure to prevent him from doing these
acts shocks the conscience." " The court was not willing to impute
such a large series of assumptions to the county. 5 4 7
The plaintiffs' procedural due process theory was one based on re-
spondeat superior.5  Very simply, the court noted that such liability
does not give rise to an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and it rejected
that claim.
The court similarly found that liability did not attach to the county
itself here. 5 o In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that, for
such liability to attach to the government, there must be a showing of
deliberate indifference on the part of the employees, something that
the court did not find here.5 5 ' Thus, the court dismissed all of the
plaintiffs' claims under the federal constitution. 5
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The state law claims did find more traction with the court.' The
state law claims in this matter were IED and NIED against the
county's employees and for NIED, negligent supervision, and negli-
gent retention against the county. 554
The court found the employees immune in their individual capacity
from the emotional distress claims under state law, finding no bad
faith or corrupt motive in their actions.5 5 The court also found that
the employees were immune from the negligent supervision claims in
their individual capacity.5 5 6 However, the county was found not to be
entitled to immunity from the negligent retention claims. 5 As to the
official capacities of these parties, the court did find that issues of ma-
terial fact were outstanding that prohibited a ruling on summary judg-
ment.5 5' The court also found that the employees were not immune
from suits in their individual capacity because such immunity depends
on whether the employees acted in a wanton and reckless manner,
which is a question of fact that is not proper for consideration in a
motion for summary judgment.559
This case is informative, albeit shocking, of the potential personal
liability of government actors. 6 o Although this case does not reach
the ultimate conclusion of whether these employees are liable, it also
does not simply reject the plaintiffs' claims outright.561 In the end, as
with so many cases reviewed herein, this case instructs that those work-
ing with the dead are in a position of heightened emotions where
general legal rules may not apply.5 6' As employers, governmental or
private, close scrutiny of employee actions will help to mitigate poten-
tial liability.563
A unique, but likely to recur, case is Casouras v. Department of Califor-
nia Highway Patrol564 In this case, a family brought suit against the
Department of California Highway Patrol ("DCHP"), whose officers e-
mailed graphic photographs of a fatal automobile accident to nongov-
ernmental employees for purposes not related to any investigation. 65
In short, as the court stated, the officers "e-mailed nine gruesome
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death images to their friends and family members on Halloween for
pure shock value.""' These images went viral on the internet and
eventually found their way back to the deceased's family. 6 7
The family brought suit against the DCHP, under various theories,
including emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and a violation of the
right to control remains."' This case may have substantial implica-
tions for cemetery regulators who take photographs containing
human remains during the course of various investigations or for cem-
eteries, funeral directors, or coroners who take photographs of de-
ceased individuals during the course and scope of their employment if
the photographs are used in a manner inconsistent with an investiga-
569tion or a teaching scenario.
The court first found that the DCHP was not immune to suit for the
actions of its officers with regard to this matter. 70 In order to deter
mine whether there was an invasion of privacy, the court had to deter-
mine whether the family had an actual privacy interest of the deceased
in death images.5 7 1 Finding that such an interest does exist,57 2 the
court had to consider whether there was an exemption that would
have allowed the transmission of the subject photographs (i.e., investi-
gation or education). In finding that there was no such exemption,
the court held that the officers' actions were those of "pure morbidity
and sensationalism without legitimate public interest or law enforce-
ment purpose."5 74
The court also found that the district court improperly dismissed
the plaintiffs claims that DCHP's actions were the equivalent of
IIED.57 However, the court did recognize that DCHP was negligent
for failing to supervise its employees, and, as such, was likely liable for
the negligence claims of the plaintiffs. 76 In finding such negligence,
the California court noted that DCHP "owed a duty of care to plain-
tiffs not to place decedent's death images on the Internet for the lurid
titillation of persons unrelated to official CHP business." 7 7
This case is not clearly determinative of the issues of whether liabil-
ity exists for those that would distribute photographs of deceased indi-
566. Id.
567. Id.
568. Id. at 865-66.
569. Id. at 874.
570. Id. at 889-90.
571. Id. at 868.
572. Id. at 872-73.
573. Id. at 874.
574. Id.
575. Id. at 875.
576. Id. at 884. It is important to note that this case does not completely decide
any substantial issues; rather it deals with challenges to the district court's
dismissal of the plaintiff's claims. The substantive issues, presumably, will
be dealt with on remand. See id.
577. Id. at 886.
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viduals for reasons other than investigation or educational
purposes.57 8 From an intellectual property perspective, this case vests
a property right in decedents' family members of images of the de-
ceased when copyright law would generally vest all property right in
such images in the creator of the image.17' The combination of these
factors suggests that those with control over such images should be
careful to control access to and use of such images due to the gener-
ally shocking nature.s 0
E. Rights to buial spaces and burials in the wrong place
A particularly disturbing area of the law from the perspective of
family relations and from the perspective of cemetery management is
when people fight over who has the right to be buried where. The
following cases review a few recent examples of such problems.
In Poe v. Gaunce,"' a family fought over the ownership of two grave
spaces and a monument all within one family plot in Kentucky.'
The dispute arose when one family faction, the Gates, decided to
move the remains of their direct ascendants.' The other faction, the
Gaunces, prior to the disinterment (which neither side opposed), re-
moved the communal monument from the plot and refused to re-
place it.584 The Gates, despite not having any sort of deed or title to
the spaces from which they were removing their relatives (the specific
people being disinterred were allowed to use the spaces based on con-
sanguinity to the Gaunces) asserted that they could now do with the
empty spaces as they saw fit.5 '
The Poe court correctly noted that intermit rights in Kentucky, as in
most other jurisdictions, are not equivalent to fee ownership of the
actual burial spaces, but are more akin to easements allowing the use
of the spaces for burial." Because of the similarity of this property
right in Kentucky to analogous rights in other jurisdictions, this case
presents a useful review of the nature of interment rights and the ap-
propriate results of various claims to those rights. 8 The Poe court
goes on to note that the easement acquired by the interment right
owner confers upon that person the right to decide who is interred in
578. See id. at 864, 874.
579. 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2006).
580. See Catsouras, 181 Cal. App. 4th at 864.
581. Poe v. Gaunce, 371 S.W.3d 769 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011).
582. Id. at 770-71.
583. Id. at 771.
584. Id. at 771-72
585. See id. at 772.
586. Id at 773.
587. A.M. Swarthouse, Annotation, Deed as Conveying Fee or Easement, 136 A.L.R.
379, 399-404 (1942).
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the space. 8 Absent a specific legacy, this right devolves to the
owner's heirs upon the owner's death.589
In affirming the trial court's holding that the Gaunce heirs con-
trolled all rights of interment in the family plot, the Poe court found
that the evidence supported title in the Gaunce family alone. 9 o Fur-
ther, the fact that there had been Gates buried in the Gaunce plot for
a long time did not confer ownership to the Gates family in those
specific spaces, as the burials were made with the permission of the
Gaunce patriarch."' The court commented that " [i] t is a well settled
rule that use of property by express or implied permission or license,
no matter how long continued, cannot ripen into an easement by pre-
scription. . ."'9 For this reason, the Poe court rejected the Gates'
claim of adverse possession of the subject spaces. 9
The court also held that the specific Gates family members who
were interested in the plot did not acquire any interest in the space. 5 9 4
The court observed that these people were essentially given limited
easements for their own burials from the interment right owner. 9
These easements did not extend to other family members.596
As to the monument removed by the Gaunce heirs, even though
the two Gates names were engraved on it, the actual monument was
purchased by the Gaunce patriarch and thus devolved as part of his
patrimony to his heirs.' 9 The Gates heirs gained no interest in the
monument and the Gaunces could do with it as they pleased. 98
In King v. French,* the Arkansas Court of Appeals was faced with a
dispute concerning encroaching burials between two families' plots
(the Kings and the Keys).oo In this case, the King family sought disin-
terment as a remedy for the encroachment.o' Although the King
family contended that three members of the Key family were buried
within their plot, they sought disinterment of only the most recent
burial.60 2 The reason for this distinction is that the first two encroach-
ing burials seemed to be accidental as a result of poor surveying; 0 3
588. Poe, 371 S.W.3d at 773.
589. Id.
590. Id. at 774.
591. Id. at 775.
592. Id. A similar outcome would obtain at civil law through the concept of
precarious possession. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 3473 (2013).
593. Poe, 371 S.W.3d at 775.
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however, the third Key burial was made after the Kings had notified
the Keys of the problem.6 0 4 Thus, argued King, this most recent bur-
ial must be moved.o5
For some reason (unknown to the court), the King family waited
two decades following the last Key burial to bring this suit.o Because
of this delay, the court found that the Kings had lost their rights to
repel the encroaching burials due to laches.o0 Although the court's
decision in this case appears to be strictly based on the inordinate
passage of time from when the burials occurred and when the Kings
brought suit, an argument can be made that the court, while com-
menting that "[t]he special consideration given to burial plots re-
quires that in some respects they not be treated as subject to the laws
of ordinary property," 0 s might have found as it did even if the Key
burials had been made recently, as the court seemed to indicate that it
was loathe to order disinterment.609
The King case is also interesting because it seems to carve out an-
other unique attribute of cemetery law from the broader arena of
property law. One thing that the litigants in this case were seeking was
the declaring of a boundary between their two burial plots. 1 o Both at
common law and at civil law, the right to bring a boundary determina-
tion action is imprescriptible.i However, the King case seems to sug-
gest, by indicating that the right to repel the encroaching burials has
been extinguished due to the passage of time, that the ability to fix
the boundary between these two plots has also evaporated.6 12 The
court never specifically mentions this possibility, but considering the
holding, it cannot be ruled out as a new cemetery-specific exception
to general property law regimes."
In Service Corporation International ("SCI") v. Guerra,6 14 the Texas Su-
preme Court was faced with a question of what damage, if any, is ap-
propriate when a cemetery operator puts a grave in the wrong
place." In this case, the cemetery accidentally buried the deceased
in a space sold to someone else. 1 Despite the family's refusal to au-
thorize moving the deceased to the correct space, the cemetery moved
him anyway.61' Ajury found the cemetery liable for damages and the
604. Id.
605. Id.
606. Id. at 431-32
607. Id. at 431.
608. Id.
609. Id.
610. Id. at 427.
611. 11 C.J.S. Boundaries § 192 (2013); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. Art. 788 (2013).
612. King 383 S.W. 3d at 431-32.
613. See generally id.
614. Serv. Corp. Int'l v. Guerra, 348 S.W.3d 221 (Tx. 2010).
615. Id.
616. Id. at 226.
617. Id.
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Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded the matter for a new
trial. 18
The actual movement of the deceased was only one of 12 to 18 in-
ches away from the wrong space (in which it seemed merely to en-
croach and not actually completely use) .619 The movement of the
deceased was noticed by the family when they saw disturbed earth over
the grave.62 0 The error resulted in SCI being cast in judgment by a
jury for $6.2 million, mostly for mental anguish.6 2 1
One of the issues on appeal was whether SCI and its subsidiaries
were liable for these damages or whether it was just the subsidiaries, as
the parties who caused the error.622 On this issue, the court limited
the liability to the employer (the local cemetery with actual supervi-
sion over the employees that caused the error) and did not impute
that liability to the larger parent company.62 3
On the issue of mental anguish, the court agreed that some harm
was caused.6 24 Indeed, although mental anguish (emotional distress)
is typically only awarded when the claiming party actually witnesses the
event - which the Guerras clearly did not in this case - the court
thought it appropriate to extend those rights to family that did not
witness the complained of event when the claims involved "the mis-
handling of a corpse."6 2 ' Even with this extension, the court's review
of the evidence did not identify any harm to the decedent's daugh-
ters. 26 It did, however, find evidence of harm to the decedent's
widow. 627
Interestingly, the court also examined the question of whether the
Guerras could introduce evidence of SCI's well-publicized similar
problems in some of its other cemeteries.12 1 In finding that this evi-
dence had been erroneously admitted at the trial court, the Supreme
Court stated that there was an insufficient ". . .connection between the
events in this case and the allowed actions of other lawsuits. . "629In
short, because the Guerras could not show that double selling plots
was an SCI scheme instead of isolated errors, the evidence of other
such errors was inadmissible.O
618. Id.
619. Id. at 227.
620. Id.
621. Id.
622. Id. at 227-231.
623. Id.
624. Id. at 231.
625. Id.
626. Id. at 232.
627. Id. at 232-33.
628. Id. at 235-37.
629. Id. at 235.
630. Id. at 235-37.
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However, finding that there were reversible errors, the Texas Su-
preme Court remanded the matter for a new trial.6 31 Following the
retrial of the Guerra case, a newjury again found that SCI had commit-
ted fraud with regard to the above space sales and moving of re-
mains.63 2 Unlike the original trial, the jury in the retrial also found
that all but one of the plaintiffs' claims in this matter had lapsed due
to the tolling of the statute of limitations.6"' The trial court disre-
garded this latter finding and rendered judgment in favor of all of the
plaintiffs.6 3 4 The appellate court, while noting that some circum-
stances allow for a trial court to overrule a jury's finding of prescrip-
tion, agreed with the jury's finding that all but one of the plaintiffs
filed their suits too late, thus overturning the verdict in favor of all but
one of the plaintiffs.13 ' As to the one plaintiff remaining, the appel-
late court found that the jury was incorrect in finding that she had
suffered compensable mental anguish from the defendants' acts."
Simply, the appellate court was not convinced that the remaining
plaintiffs complaints that she was troubled by her father's disinter-
ment were sufficient to meet the legal burden for recovery for mental
anguish.63 Because this basis for recovery was rejected on appeal, the
punitive damages that were tied to this theory were also rejected.13 1
The appellate court also rejected the jury's fraud finding based on a
lack of evidence to support the finding.' Thus, this case becomes
another example of the difficulties of proving mental anguish and
fraud in a cemetery context."o The case is also illustrative of the ef-
fects of a cemetery case on ajury verdict as opposed to a bench trial -
the emotion has an impact.6 4 '
In the Missouri case of Carson v. Dixon Cemetery,"4 an interesting
procedural question arose as to when someone's cause of action ac-
crues as to ownership of a cemetery space that is disputed.6 4 3 In this
case, there were multiple sales of the same cemetery plot,6 4 4 leading
to a scenario in which three parties were claiming an ownership right
to the same plot. 6 45 One of the parties, believing that she held title to
the space, did not become involved in the litigation between the other
631. Id. at 239.
632. Serv. Corp. Int'l v. Leal, 2012 WL 4854754, 2 (Tx.App. 2012).
633. Id.
634. Id.
635. Id. at *5.
636. Id. at *6-8.
637. Id. at *6.
638. Id. at *8.
639. Id. at *9.
640. Id.
641. Id.
642. Carson v. Dixon Cemetery, 357 S.W.3d 288 (Mo.App. 5 Dist., Div 2 2012).
643. Id. at 289.
644. Id. at 289-90.
645. Id. at 290.
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parties. 64 Once the ownership of the disputed space was adjudicated,
the nonjoined party filed suit for fraudulent misrepresentation for the
cemetery's failure to tell her that she did not own the cemetery
space.6 4 7 The district court dismissed the latter suit on a motion for
summary judgment based upon prescription of the plaintiffs fraud
claims, finding that she should have filed her fraud claims when the
other suit was ongoing.648 Because she did not so file, the fraud
claims were barred by the statute of limitations.6 49 On appeal, the
court reversed this finding, stating that, until there was a judgment in
the original suit that determined ownership of the cemetery space, the
plaintiffs claims had not yet even accrued."o For this reason, the
plaintiffs cause of action had not prescribed as it did not run from
the filing of the suit to which she was not a party, but rather from the
judgment in that case that was adverse to her ownership rights."
The significance of the Carson case is that all possible claimants to a
disputed cemetery space should be joined in a single litigation in or-
der to resolve all ownership questions in one proceeding.6 " In addi-
tion, this case also implies that rights of action for cemetery space
ownership can arise subsequent to adverse judgments from other par-
ties, thus meaning that such claims can remain alive much longer
than a simple read of the statute of limitations might suggest.'
The case of Bernstein v. Mount Ararat Cemetery, Inc.,6 54 presents a
unique twist on the problem of burials being put in the wrong
place.' In this case, the plaintiff sued the cemetery for placing her
sister in the wrong grave space, thus disrupting her own ability to be
buried next to her husband when the time came.' The plaintiffs
claims sounded in both contract and tort.6 5 7 The contract claim re-
volved around the contractual agreement when the plaintiff pur-
chased a series of grave spaces that included a requirement to obtain
consent from the plaintiff prior to placing a body in one of the
spaces. 5 Here, the erroneous burial occurred because no such con-
sent was obtained or sought prior to the problematic burial. 5' The




649. Id. at 291.




654. Bernstein v. Mount Ararat Cemetery, Inc., No. 11 CV 68 (DRH) (WDW),
2012 WL 3887228, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2012).
655. Id. at *1.
656. Id.
657. Id.
658. Id. at *3.
659. Id.
2013] 53
54 University of Baltimore Journal of Land and Development [Vol. 3
sent, but claimed that the plaintiffs refusal to consent to an exhuma-
tion of her sister in order to correct the error meant that she had
failed to mitigate the damages for breach and thus either could not
recover or should not recover as much as she was seeking.660 The
court in this case disagreed and found that the failure to get consent
was a breach and that the plaintiff had fully performed under the con-
tract (i.e., she paid), thus the failure to mitigate was not a viable de-
fense.66 ' The court did reject the plaintiffs claims for recovery as a
third party beneficiary of her sister's interment contract, simply find-
ing that she had no standing in this regard.'
As to the plaintiffs negligence claims, for which she sought dam-
ages for emotional distress for the incorrect interment of her sister
and the fact that she cannot be buried next to her husband, the plain-
tiff alleged that these claims were based on duties of cemeteries and
undertakers to ensure the proper handling of remains. 63 In this case,
the court agreed with the defendant, stating that, because the duties
alleged to be owed to the plaintiff were identical to the defendant's
contractual obligations, there was no separate tort cause of action
available to the plaintiff.6 6 4 As to the plaintiffs tort claim resulting
from her inability to be buried with her husband, the court refused to
recognize this as an actionable claim under New York law.6 '
This case is particularly instructive because it contains a meaningful
review of the "right of sepulcher" under common law. 6 6 6 In this case,
the court observed that the right of sepulcher is "l[t]he common-law
right ... [that] gives the next of kin the absolute right to the immedi-
ate possession of a decedent's body. . ."66" The court noted that dis-
turbances of this right are, unlike many emotional distress claims,
often actionable.66' This observation is particularly significant in light
of the large numbers of cases reported here in which claims of emo-
tional distress, as a nonspecific tort, have been rejected.6 6' However,
in this case, after reviewing the concept of the right of sepulcher, the
court rejected the plaintiffs claims for recovery thereunder."o In do-
ing so, the court noted that this right is one to be exercised by the
family of the deceased, not by the pre-deceased prior to being
dead.6 7 ' The court held that, "[d]amages are therefore only recover-
660. Id.
661. Id. at *4.
662. Id. at *5.
663. Id. at *1.
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able by close relatives who have suffered emotional trauma as a result
of the deprivation of that right."6 72
In addition to the above analysis, the court also rejected the plain-
tiff's argument that the right of sepulcher allows her to recover for the
incorrect placement of her sister's remains.6 7' As the court notes, al-
though she is in a proper position to benefit from the right of sepul-
cher as a close relative of her sister, the right of sepulcher deals with
recovery for harms to the body, not to the gravesite as the plaintiff
claimed in this case.67
Interestingly, on reconsideration, although the court did not vacate
its earlier analysis of the right of sepulcher, nor did it overrule itself
on the outcome of the original decision, it did note that it incorrectly
classified the plaintiffs claims as a claim to a right of sepulcher rather
than a general negligence claim.6 7' However, as with other cases deal-
ing with the negligent handling of the dead, the court reached the
same decision in this review of the plaintiffs claims as it had before:
the plaintiff did not have a viable standing claim in this matter.6 7 6
This determination was based largely on the premise that, because
such claims for general negligence (in this case, emotional distress)
may be brought by the decedent's sons and because such individuals
are necessary parties to any such litigation, the plaintiff cannot assert
such claims in the absence of all necessary parties. 7
F. Disinterment and desecration
Although there have recently been a handful of reported cases deal-
ing with the rights of various parties to undertake disinterments, there
have not been as many dealing with desecration as the reports of this
activity in the media would suggest occur.67 8 Personal experience sug-
gests that this discrepancy is more a reflection of the lack of desecra-
tion and vandalism prosecutions brought due to difficulties of proof
and a general lack of interest among law enforcement for such crimes.
Recent cases on disinterment and desecration are combined here be-
cause they both relate to some postmortem meddling with burials
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In Hiller v. Washington Cemetery,6so a cemetery and benevolent society
were both dragged into a family dispute over the disposition of a
man's remains.68 The man's girlfriend sought his disinterment for
cremation - apparently the disposition that the man had directed.6 82
However, the man's brother, who was responsible for the interment,
believed that he should not be cremated, in accordance with restric-
tions of Orthodox Judaism.6 ' The cemetery and benevolent society
were named as third parties by the brother, "in essence demanding
that each entity maintain the decedent's grave and defend against any
interference with it."68 4
Contrary to his brother's wishes, the decedent in Hiller made ar-
rangements for his own cremation prior to his death." However,
when he died, the brother, as the closest adult relative had taken con-
trol of the remains and had them buried.' Ultimately, the New
Jersey Superior Court found that the will was controlling and that the
deceased's wishes must be honored, even noting that such wishes may
not need to be reduced to writing.6 ' The Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court's order for disinterment and cremation.688
Interestingly, the trial court found, and the Supreme Court agreed,
that the naming of the cemetery and benevolent society in this matter
was frivolous and costs were awarded to those entities.6 8' Essentially,
tery, where she was buried by her spouse, and buried in a Greek Orthodox
mausoleum); In re John G. and Marie Stelly Kennedy Memorial Founda-
tion, 315 S.W. 3d 519 (Tx. 2010) (woman suing to exhume the decedent
for a paternity test); Brewer v. American Medical Alert Group, 2010 WL
280986 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 20, 2010) (the Court granting a request in the
wrongful death case for a disinterment and autopsy); Afalonis v. Afalonis,
90 A.D. 3d 917 (N.Y.S. 2d 2011) (refusing to permit an exhumation);
Robinson v. Forest Creek L.P., 712 S.E.2d 895 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (a fam-
ily suing developer for alleged damage to a historic family cemetery on the
developer's property); State of Tennesee v. McClain, 2010 WL 3244897
(Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 17, 2010) (denying the request of an admitted
cemetery vandal that sought a reduction in his sentence and restitution);
Huntsman v. State, 971 N.E. 2d 215 (In. Ct. App. 2012) (refusing to reduce
the sentence of the defendant who dug five feet of dirt from above a grave
of a recently deceased individual, ". . with the intent of attempting to resur-
rect. . ." the deceased and proceed to urinate in the plot); Childers v.
Brelje, 2012 WL 1970090 (Minn. Ct. App. Jun. 4, 2012) (approving the
mother's request to exhume her son and bury him in a different plot so
that the mother could be buried next to her son).
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the courts found that no such duties to preserve under the circum-
stances existed on behalf of these entities.so
A similar religious dispute was at issue in the disinterment suit of
Estate of Puder.6 1 In this case, the court was faced with considering the
rights of parties with no statutory classification as a stakeholder under
New Jersey's disinterment law.6 92 In this case, the decedent, who was
raised as a Greek Orthodox, married a Jew against the wishes of her
mother.9 Upon her death, the decedent was interred in a Jewish
cemetery and the mother brought an action for her disinterment and
removal to a Greek Orthodox mausoleum.6 9 4 Notably, the decedent's
will did not provide for her funeral or burial.' In this case, the court
spent little time in rejecting the mother's claims for disinterment on
the grounds that she had no statutory right to control same. 9 The
court recognized that under New Jersey law, the only time a surviving
spouse's wishes for the deceased (in absence of a testament) will be
scrutinized by a court is when an equally qualified party (in New
Jersey, a majority of the adult children of the deceased) object to the
spouse's decision.6 9 7 Most important is the court's recognition of the
policy that all cemetery-related statutes are intended "to allow the de-
ceased to lie at rest."6 ' This is a consistent theme nationwide,
whereby the courts generally disfavor disinterment.69 9
Taking the disfavoring of disinterment further was the recent Texas
case of In re: John G. and Marie Stelly Kennedy Memorial Foundation.oo
In this case, some sixty years after the interment of the deceased, a
woman came forward to assert her claim as an heir to the deceased's
estate.o 1 She obtained an exhumation order from a probate court in
order to perform genetic tests to prove her affiliation to the de-
ceased.70 2 The Texas court considered various iterations of the wo-
man's claims to an inheritance, ultimately finding that a decades-old
judgment holding that the deceased died testate and with no surviving
children was unassailable. 70 s The Texas Supreme Court further
690. Id. at *1-2.
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found that a probate court lacked jurisdiction to order an exhumation
and that, because even a positive paternity result would not allow for
the woman to recover (due to the earlier final judgment), it would be
an abuse of discretion to order an exhumation.704
In the Tennessee case of Brewer v. American Medical Alert Group,705
the court reiterated the general anti-disinterment principle when it
noted that, "[i]t is well settled that '[t]he quiet of the grave, the re-
pose of the dead, are not lightly to be disturbed. Good and substantial
reasons must be shown before disinterment is sanctioned."' 70 In this
case, the court, though noting this general principle and stating that
when requests for autopsies subsequent to burial are supported by evi-
dence of a "reasonable probability that the true cause of death would
be revealed,"' granted a request in this wrongful death case for a
disinterment and autopsy.70 s This case does not provide much gui-
dance as to what such evidence may look like and it seems to leave a
considerable amount of room for interpretation in future cases. How-
ever, its recapitulation of the concept that disinterments are disfa-
vored is informative.709
In a second autopsy case, Afalonis v. Afalonis,710 a New York court,
commenting more forcefully than the Tennessee court on the disfa-
vored nature of disinterment,71' did not authorize an exhumation. 712
The New York court noted that "it must exercise a benevolent discre-
tion when deciding whether to "disturb [the] repose" of the
dead. 1
In Robinson v. Forest Creek L.P.,715 a family brought an action for civil
desecration against a developer for alleed damage to a historic family
cemetery on the developer's property. 16 This case contains several
interesting components: access to cemeteries, civil desecration, and
proof of desecration. 1 As an initial matter, the family in this case
sought and received an order allowing them the authority to enter the
developer's property to search for a cemetery believed to exist
thereon.7 "8 This fact alone seems to expand descendant's rights to
704. Id. at 522-523.
705. Brewer v. Am. Med. Alert Group, 2010 WL 280986 (M.D. Tenn. 2010).
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access the property of others to visit and maintain existing graves.79
The latter is a well-recognized right of the descendant community in
many jurisdictions.720 However, it is quite a distance from accessing
someone else's property to clean a known cemetery in comparison to
accessing it to search for a suspected cemetery.72' Such a holding
(were it that) might prove useful to preservationists nationwide. 7 2 2
However, there is no substantive discussion of this issue in the re-
ported case aside from a mention that the access was granted by way
of a consent judgment.7 2 1
In this case, the family claimed that the developer desecrated a fam-
ily cemetery by bulldozing a fence and at least two above-ground
markers.7 2' Although with the help of an archaeologist the family was
able to locate the missing burials, the fence and markers, which had
been witnessed within the preceding decade, were gone.725 From
these facts, the civil desecration claim arose.
Civil desecration is distinguished from criminal desecration, as it
seeks civil penal relief.72 7 In addition, unlike criminal proceedings,
civil desecration can be brought by members of the public.728 In this
case, the North Carolina Appeals Court specifically examined the
claim of civil desecration and determined it to be a viable cause of
action in North Carolina, even though it noted that no elements to
prove such action exist in the law. 729
Filling in the gaps, the court noted that the threshold element of
civil desecration is the actual desecration itself.7so In this case, al-
though the fence and markers were undeniably absent, the court was
unable to find any evidence that the developer was the cause of their
absence.7 1' Thus, although the court arguably provided some dicta
supporting the ability to access property to search for missing ceme-
teries and recognized that the cause of action of civil desecration is
viable in North Carolina, it did not find that such desecration oc-
curred - at least not at the hands of the developer.7 3 2
719. Id.
720. See, e.g., Cemeteries, La. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 08-0186, (Aug. 19, 2008).
721. See id.
722. See Robinson, 712 S.E.2d 895.
723. Id. at 895.
724. Id. at 896.
725. Id.
726. See id.
727. See TRAcY BATEMAN FARRELL, Am. JUR. 2D Cemeteries § 43-46 (2013).
728. See id.
729. Robinson, 712 S.E.2d at 897.
730. Id.
731. Id. at 897-898.
732. Id.
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In State of Tennessee v. McClain,13 the appellate court was presented
with an admitted cemetery vandal seeking a reduction in his sentence
and restitution. 7 34 At issue in this case was $60,000.00 worth of ceme-
tery damage occasioned by five men on an apparent drunken
bender.3 The vandal seeking a reduction was the driver, who ap-
peared to take no active part in the cemetery damage.7 3 ' For his in-
volvement, the trial court sentenced him to 150 days in jail, six years
of probation, and $5,000.00 in restitution.
In considering whether to grant some leniency, the trial court
noted that, "[t]he circumstances of the offense are horrendous. I've
already described how the [c]ourt views them. It is something that is
senseless, no justification. It wasn't just a youthful indiscretion." 7 3
Then citing numerous other factors, the trial court rejected the re-
quest for leniency and the appellate court affirmed. 739 Further, the
appellate court held that, despite the vandal's prospects of only a min-
imum wage job upon his release from prison, the restitution award
was not unreasonable.740
The only other reviewed criminal desecration case is that of Hunts-
man v. State.74 1 Although the case is unreported, 742 it is worthy of re-
view. In this case, the defendant pled guilty to having dug five feet of
dirt from above a grave of a recently-deceased individual, .... .with the
intent of attempting to resurrect. . ." the deceased. 43 While digging,
the defendant also urinated in the grave.744
On appeal, the defendant was seeking a reduction of his sentence
of one year, which, in Indiana, was the maximum sentence for the
misdemeanor of "cemetery mischief."745 The appellate court affirmed
the maximum sentence, commenting that the severity of the crime
was shocking. 7 4 6
Although this case is unreported, it is illustrative of the disturbing
nature of desecration. 747 It and McClain are also illustrative of the
lack of remorse that the courts show when faced with these crimes,
733. State of Tennessee v. McClain, No. M2009-00942-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL
3244897 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. App. 2010).
734. Id. at *1.
735. Id.
736. Id.
737. Id. at *3.
738. Id. at *5.
739. Id. at *5-6.
740. Id. at *9-10.
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perhaps suggesting that such cases may not be a waste of prosecutors'
time.7 48 The McClain and Huntsman cases are instructive in their rar-
ity over a three-year period.' Even though the court in McClain
noted that the acts were "horrendous"750 and the news stories in Part I
of this article indicate that these acts occur constantly, there is little in
the appellate record to demonstrate the enforcement of desecration
laws.7  Whether this is a function of plea agreements or lack of en-
forcement in general is not known.75 2
The Minnesota appellate case of Childers v. Brelje75 3 presents a
unique problem related to disinterment. 7 54 In this case, the child of
an unmarried couple succumbed to cancer and was interred, on the
decision of both parents, with the father's family. 55 Because the fa-
ther's family plot was full, the mother could not be interred next to
her child as she desired and she sought an order authorizing the son's
disinterment from the agreed-upon grave and his reinterment in the
same cemetery, but in an area where adjacent spaces were available. 56
The father opposed the disinterment, citing the general presumption
against exhumation and the earlier agreement of the parents (prior to
their estrangement) to bury the child in his current location.
In this case, the court recognized the presumption against disinter-
ment and also the equal footing of both parents to make burial deci-
sions.7 5" The court then noted that Minnesota law requires, in cases
of opposed disinterments, an eight-part inquiry into whether disinter-
ment is proper.7 5' The court then proceeded to review those factors
and the district court's interpretation of them.7 0 The appellate
court, as did the district court before it, found it significant that there
was no space in the father's family plot for additional interments, thus
stymieing the mother's wishes to be eventually buried alongside her
child.7 ' Because the son would be reinterred in the same cemetery,
just in a different space, both courts found that the mother's desire
overcame the presumption against disinterment.7 6 2
748. See id.; see also State of Tennessee v. McClain, No. M2009-00942-CCA-R3-CD,
2010 WL 3244897 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. App. 2010).
749. See Huntsman, 2012 WL 3028286; see also McClain, 2010 WL 3244897.
750. McClain, 2010 WL 3244897 at *5.
751. See discussion supra Part I, pp. 24.
752. See Huntsman, 2012 WL 3028286; see also McClain, 2010 WL 3244897; See
discussion supra Part I, pp. 2-4.
753. Childers v. Brelje, 2012 WL 1970090 (Minn.App. 2012).
754. See id.
755. Id. at *1.
756. Id.
757. Id.
758. Id. at *2.
759. Id. at *2-3.
760. Id.
761. Id. at *3.
762. Id.
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Although some of the facts in this case are fairly unique, it certainly
provides some informative guidance regarding certain disinter-
ments." On the whole, this case suggests that disinterments for
reburial in the same cemetery for reasons of proximity of burial may
reasonably overcome the general presumption against
disinterment. 764
G. Human Remains Issues
The recently-reported cases on issues related to the treatment of
human remains can be divided into two subsections: Organs gone
awry and unmarked burial disturbances.7 " The latter subcategory is
distinguished from the earlier discussed desecration cases because it
relates to what to do with the remains after they have been disturbed
or discovered (or both) as opposed to the penalties for
disturbances. 766
Four recent organs cases arise from the anatomical donations pro-
grams associated with the University of California system. 67 Each of
these cases involve the same basic facts and conclusions7 68 and are
thus discussed here jointly. In these cases, family members of de-
ceased who had donated their bodies to the University of California
system for research or teaching purposes brought suit against the sys-
tem following revelations that the remains may have been used in for-
profit research, used in studies found objectionable by the families, or
that the cremated remains of the deceased were not disposed of ac-
cording to the families' understandings.7 6 1 In each of these cases, the
courts looked to the terms of California's Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act and to the agreements signed by the deceased when donating
their bodies. 770 These instruments were determined to be controlling
763. See generally id. at *2-3.
764. Id. at 2 (finding that disinternment would cause the father no "additional
travel or time expenditures" when he desired to visit his son's burial plot).
765. Id. at 2 (finding that disinternment would cause the father no "additional
travel or time expenditures" when he desired to visit his son's burial plot).
766. See discussion infra Part III.G pp. 91-96.
767. See Andre v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. B211748, 2010 Cal. App.
LEXIS 6330 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2010); Lane v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,
No. B213048, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 6328 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2010);
Cohen v. Nuvasive, No. B194078, 2010 Cal App. LEXIS 2528 (Cal. Ct. App.
Apr. 7, 2010); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Court, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d
637 (2010).
768. See Andre, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 6330; Lane, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 6328;
Cohen, 2010 Cal App. LEXIS 2528; Regents, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 637.
769. See Andre, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 6330; Lane, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 6328;
Cohen, 2010 Cal App. LEXIS 2528; Regents, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 637.
770. Andre, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 6330 at *2; Lane, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 6328
at *2; Cohen, 2010 Cal App. LEXIS 2528 at *8; Regents, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
758.
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in all circumstances.7 7 ' They controlled how the remains were used
irrespective of the verbal wishes of the deceased, the expectations of
the families, or even the manner in which the remains would be used
as communicated by UC system employees. 2 The courts did not find
any legal or contractual obligation for the UC system to use the re-
mains in any particular manner, nor did they find any contractual di-
rective for the disposition of the cremated remains of the deceased.7 73
In Memorial Properties, LLC v. Zurich American Insurance, Co.,7 74 at is-
sue was whether an insurance company was liable for damages suf-
fered by families of decedents when its client, a crematory, illegally
harvested and sold the organs and body parts of the deceased. 7 In
this case, it was the actual crematory suing its insurance carrier trying
to recover for the former's losses due to the wrongdoings of its em-
ployees. 7 In this case, the acts were ostensibly covered by one of the
insurance carriers as "property damage,"77 but the court found that
the damage itself (here held to have occurred when the families
learned of the damage) occurred outside of the coverage period."7
As for the remaining insurer, the court found that the policy excluded
"improper handling of a deceased body,"7 7 ' and thus agreed that cov-
erage was properly denied by the carrier.78 0
The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Texas Su-
preme Court reviewed similar insurance-related matters in Evanston
Ins. Co. v. Legacy of Life, Inc.7 11 In this case, a Texas woman allowed
Legacy of Life, Inc. ("Legacy"), to harvest certain of her mother's or-
gans after the latter's death.782 The harvesting was, according to the
plaintiffs state court petition, made with the understanding that the
organs would be used for nonprofit purposes. 8 When the plaintiff
learned that Legacy had instead transferred the organs to a for-profit
771. Andre, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 6330 at *2; Lane, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 6328
at *2; Cohen, 2010 Cal App. LEXIS 2528 at *8-11; Regents, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d
at 758.
772. Andre, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 6330 at *2; Lane, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 6328
at *2; Cohen, 2010 Cal App.LEXIS 2528 at *8-11; Regents, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
758.
773. See Andre, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 6330 at *35-6; Lane, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS
6328 at *28; Cohen, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 2528 at *10-11; Regents, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 757.
774. Mem'l Props., LLC v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. A-0109-09T2, 2011 N.J.
Super LEXIS 587 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. Mar 10, 2011).
775. Id. at *1.
776. See id. at *2.
777. Id. at *2-3.
778. Id. at *12.
779. Id. at *5.
780. See Mem'l Props., LLC v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 46 A.3d 525 (NJ. 2012) (af-
firmed on appeal).
781. Evanston Ins. Co. v. Legacy of Life, Inc., 645 F.3d 739 (5th Cir. 2011).
782. Id. at 741.
783. Id.
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entity that subsequently sold them at a profit to various hospitals, she
sued Legacy under various theories (similar to the California cases
noted above).784 The Evanston case arose as a federal suit between an
insurer (Evanston) and it's insured (Legacy) regarding who was re-
sponsible for defending the state court suit.7 85
The primary questions presented in this case were: (1) was the
plaintiffs state court claim for emotional distress covered by the insur-
ance policy as part of the term "bodily injury"?;78' and (2) was the
alleged mishandling of organs covered under the insurance policy's
coverage of "property damage?"787 The former question, which is not
overly important to this review, was certified to the Texas Supreme
Court as a state law question.78" The latter question is interesting, as
Evanston alleged that "a deceased human's body parts are not 'tangi-
ble property.' "'7 Although the parties and the court recognized that
human organs are, colloquially, tangible,7 90 Evanston argued that, in
an insurance sense, they are not tangible as quasi property and are
thus not covered by the policy issued to Legacy.71 The Fifth Circuit,
while admitting that this question is also one of state law, alluded to
the possibility that, because of "advances in organ transplants and
medical research," organs may now be something more than quasi
property.7 9 2 Because of the state law nature of this issue, the Fifth
Circuit certified to the Texas Supreme Court the questions of whether
an insurance policy's "property damage" provisions, under Texas law,
covered the state court plaintiffs "loss of use of her deceased mother's
tissues, organs, bones, and body parts."79" The Texas Supreme Court
held that it did not.79 4 Because of the answers to these two certified
questions, the Fifth Circuit held that Evanston did not owe Legacy any
duty to defend it against the plaintiffs state law claims.79 5
784. Id. at 742.
785. Id. at 740.
786. Id. at 743.
787. Id.
788. Id. at 746-47.; See also Evanston Ins. Co. v. Legacy of Life, Inc., 2012 WL
3641641 at *164 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Evanston Ins. Co. v. Legacy of Life,
Inc., 370 S.W.3d 377 (Tex. 2012)) (The Texas Supreme Court responded
that emotional distress was not covered by the term "bodily injury under
Texas law).
789. Evanston Ins. Co., 645 F.3d at 747.
790. Id. at 748.
791. Id.
792. Id. (citing to Texas decision regarding human embryos as well as to the
Texas Anatomical Gift Act, the latter of which grants some rights in organs
to the "next of kin.").
793. Id. at 751.
794. Evanston Insurance Company v. Legacy of Life, Inc., No. 10-50267, 2012
WL 3641641(5th Cir. Aug. 24, 2012).
795. Id. at *2.
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The cases Commonwealth v. Garone," and Commonwealth v. Mas-
tromarino9 7 share related facts dealing with the theft and sale of
human body parts.79 8 The basic facts giving rise to both of these cases
are that the defendants were implicated in and convicted of allega-
tions that, through the operations of their human tissue sales business
and crematorium, they harvested human organs for sale into the
transplant market from over 200 individuals who had not given con-
sent to same and who had not passed medical history screens.79' Basi-
cally, the defendants would harvest the organs before cremation,
falsify medical documentation, and then return the remainder of the
remains - cremated - to the families of the deceased, who were none
the wiser of the scheme.800
In Garzone, the matter at issue on appeal was fairly straightforward:
could Pennsylvania recover the costs of the investigation and prosecu-
tion from the defendant as part of his sentence.s01 The court in this
case found that the provision for the legal and investigation expenses
of the Commonwealth were not recoverable, both because such recov-
ery was not provided by statute8 0 2 and because the actions for which
Pennsylvania sought reimbursement were, while "particularly hei-
nous," within the ambit of the government's "usual services," thus not
justifying any special treatment. 0 3
In Mastromarino, the mastermind of the above-noted scheme chal-
lenged the severity of his sentence.8 0 ' The sentence was an aggrega-
tion of 53 consecutive sentences, totaling 25 to 58 years in prison.805
The court spent a considerable amount of time recounting Mas-
tromarino's deeds and commenting on its general distaste for
them,8 0 6 however the actual decision was fairly simple: the court did
not find the sentence unreasonable. 0 7
These two cases are morbid curiosities from a literary perspective,
but do not present much substantive legal analysis of import. Garzone
is interesting in that it supports the notion that, when enacting legisla-
tion for regulatory enforcement, states should make efforts to include
reimbursement provisions. 0 Taken together, the real lesson of these
796. Commonwealth v. Garzone, 993 A.2d 1245 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010), aff'd, 34
A.3d 67 (Pa. 2012).
797. Commonwealth v. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d 581 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal de-
nied, 14 A.3d 825 (Pa. 2011).
798. See Garzone, 993 A.2d at 1246; Mastromarino, 2 A.3d at 583.
799. See Garzone, 993 A.2d at 1246; Mastromarino, 2 A.3d at 583.
800. See Ganone, 993 A.2d at 1247; Mastromarino, 2 A.3d at 583.
801. Garzone, 993 A.2d at 1255.
802. Id. at 1255, 1256.
803. Id. affd 34 A.3d 67 (Pa. 2012) (The decision was affirmed on appeal).
804. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d at 585.
805. Id.
806. Id. at 582-591.
807. Id. at 589.
808. See Ganone, 993 A.3d at 317-21.
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cases is that stealing and selling human organs is generally frowned
upon.8 0 9
In the case of Kaleikini v. Thielen,81 o the Hawaii Supreme Court was
faced with questions regarding who had proper standing and who
should be consulted regarding the treatment of human remains iden-
tified during construction activities.""' In this case, Native Hawaiian
human remains were encountered during construction of a shopping
center and a dispute arose as to whether the project should have been
redesigned to avoid the remains or whether a removal plan was appro-
priate.a' When the O'ahu Island Burial Council ("OIBC") voted to
approve the removal plan, a descendant of those whose remains were
discovered objected and sought a contradictory hearing on the mat-
ter.813 The request for a contradictory hearing was denied and ap-
peals ensued.""
With no small amount of foresight, the Hawaii Supreme Court
noted that "it would seem desirable for this court to provide an au-
thoritative determination providing future guidance for public offi-
cials" and that such guidance was advisable because "it seems probable
that [human remains] will continue to be unearthed at future con-
struction projects."s' Although much of this case deals with procedu-
ral matters not overly important to cemetery or human remain
matters, what is interesting is that the court recognizes that the regula-
tory review board, the OIBC, did not properly consult with the plain-
tiff and because the court also found that the plaintiffs claims to
lineal descendancy were valid, she had standing not only to be con-
sulted, but also to bring an action for review of the consultation pro-
cess.81 1 If nothing else, this case suggests that, for the purposes of
consultation when making decisions under state unmarked burial pro-
tection laws, both regulators and the regulated (in this case the devel-
oper) would have been better served had they erred on the side of
more consultation than to fight standing on the back end. 1 ' In this
case, nearly four years were lost during legal battles over whether con-
sultation was necessary. 18 This waste of time and resources should
give pause to those attempting to shortcut or sidestep the regulatory
process when human remains are involved. 1
809. See Garzone, 993 A.2d 306, see also Mastromarin, 2 A.3d 581.
810. Kaleikini v. Thielen, 237 P. 3d 1067 (Haw. 2010).
811. Id. at 1071-1078.
812. Id. at 1071-1072.
813. Id.
814. Id. at 1073.
815. Id. at 1079.
816. Id. at 1093. See also Kaleikini v. Yoshioka, 283 P.3d 60 (Haw. 2012); Hall v.
Dep't of Land and Natural Res., 290 P.3d 525 (Haw. Int. App. 2012).
817. Kaleikini, 237 P. 3d at 1093
818. See id. at 1071-78. The case began in public meetings in 2006 and was de-
cided by the Hawaii Supreme Court in 2010. See id.
819. See id.
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In Hall v. Department of Land and Natural Resources,8 20 a Native Ha-
waiian sued the State and a church over the church's plans to expand
the footprint of the structures on its property.82 ' The area for the
expansion was known to have been used as a cemetery since the 1800s
and the church itself qualified as a historic property.8 2 2 In spite of the
likelihood that burials would be impacted by the construction project,
the state authorized construction without an archaeological survey.8 23
During various construction activities, 69 burials were impacted
before the state stopped the construction to reassess matters. 2
In 2009, Hall filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief against the state and the church.8 25 Hall's primary argument
was that the project could not go forward because the required
archaeological work had not been done.82 6 As in Kaleikini, supra,
Hall's standing was challenged and was upheld.8 2 ' The district court
did not find that an archaeological survey was mandated by law and
also found that Hall's cited laws on cemetery preservation and historic
preservation to be mutually exclusive. 28 Finally, the district court did
allow Hall to amend her petition with the all-important cemetery dedi-
cation argument. 829 This argument, which was later raised by
Kaleikini in a separate action against the state and the church, essen-
tially alleged that the project area was a known cemetery and until the
dedication was removed, the property could not be used for anything
but a cemetery.so A separate district court judge granted Kaleikini's
cemetery dedication request, essentially providing Hall the denied re-
lief.s On the appeal of Hall's case, the court found that the ceme-
tery protection and historic preservation laws to be complementary,
thus reversing the district court on this point. Interestingly, the ap-
pellate court examined the nature of the use of the cemetery at is-
sue. 3 Part of the cemetery was known and marked and was not
subject to impacts from the project.83 4 Part of the same cemetery was
unmarked and under laid a cement slab." The court did not find
820. Hall, 290 P.3d 525, cert. denied 2013 WL 2450773 (Haw. 2013) (Plaintiffs
request for cert.), cert. granted 2013 WL 3064928 (Haw. 2013) (State's re-
quest for cert.).
821. Id. at 527.
822. Id.
823. Id.
824. Id. at 530.
825. Id.
826. Id.
827. Id. at 535.
828. Id. at 532.
829. Id. at 530-32.
830. Id. at 531.
831. Id. at 531-32.
832. Id. at 540.
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this to be a problem for the application of cemetery protection laws
that exempt known, marked cemeteries."3 The court simply noted
that different laws applied to different parts of the cemetery.837 The
areas of the cemetery that were unmarked were controlled by the
cemetery protection laws for unmarked cemeteries and the areas that
were marked were not.83 8
This is a practical, but perhaps difficult means for dealing with this
common problem.8 3 ' This case and the other Hawai'i cases reviewed
here clearly place Hawai'i at the forefront of jurisprudence imple-
menting unmarked cemetery protection.8 4 0
In 2012, Kaleikini brought another challenge regarding burials in
the Hawai'i Supreme Court case of Kaleikini v. Yoshioka.84 1 In this
case, the plaintiff challenged the thoroughness of efforts to identify
and protect Native Hawaiian burial sites in the planning process of a
rail project in the Honolulu area.84 2 The defendant challenged the
plaintiffs standing, alleging that she could point to no irreparable in-
jury sufficient to challenge the rail plan." The court disagreed, not-
ing that although no Native Hawaiian burials had yet been identified
in the planning process, the high probability of disturbing such buri-
als coupled with the plaintiffs cultural affiliation (and thus general
interest) in the Native Hawaiians likely to be disturbed was a sufficient
"threatened irreparable injury" to constitute standing.844
One major problem in this case for the government actors was the
fact that the project had been approved prior to the completion of an
archaeological impact survey.8 4 5 Thus, as approved, the government
could not say with certainty that burials would not be disturbed."
The court found that partial completion of such surveys did not
equate to complying with the legal obligations to protect and avoid
cultural and historical sites (including burials) because once the pro-
ject was underway based upon a partially-complete survey, no-build
and alternative options to mitigate or avoid impacts were effectively
foreclosed. 4
This case includes a lengthy discussion of non-cemetery historic




839. A similar approach has been suggested, but never litigated in Louisiana.
See, e.g., Ms. Lucy L. McCann, La. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 07-0183 (2007).
840. See generally Hall, 128 Haw. 455.
841. Kaleikini v. Yoshioka, 128 Haw. 53, 283 P.3d, reconsid. denied, 128 Haw. 199,
285 P.3d 1013 (2012).
842. Id. at 63.
843. Id at 75.
844. Id. at 76-77.
845. Id. at 77.
846. Id.
847. Id. at 77.
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cle.8 48 However, this case strongly suggests that the likelihood of cem-
etery disturbance for a project without reasonable steps to mitigate
such disturbances can create standing to challenge such projects from
the descendant communities.8 4 ' This is a logistical reality that regula-
tors and developers should incorporate into their project planning
processes. 5 o
The final case in this section is Geronimo v. Obama.51 This case
deals with whether a suit can go forward under the Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act ("NAGPRA")"5 between
those claiming to be the lineal descendents of the "legendary Apache
warrior, Geronimo"** and the United States and Yale University for
the return of remains buried by the Army and allegedly stolen and
retained by Yale's Order of Skull and Bones.85 4 The court in this case
quickly dismissed the claims against the United States because it ob-
served that the United States enjoys sovereign immunity from suit and
that NAGPRA does not waive that immunity.8 55 The court also ob-
served that NAGPRA does contain a waiver of sovereign immunity
under the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") .8" However, be-
cause the United States had no hand in the alleged acquisition of the
remains by Yale, there was no available APA claim.' Finally, as to the
claims against Yale, the court noted that, because the complaint did
not allege that the remains were acquired after the 1990 effective date
of NAGPRA, there was no available cause of action as to the private
defendants either.5
III. Discussion and Conclusion
Because this article was designed as a review, it is difficult to make
any overarching conclusions regarding the matters herein discussed.
This is the nature of a nationwide jurisprudential review of an ever-
evolving area of the law.
The cases reviewed herein clearly indicate that cemeteries and
human remains, from a legal perspective, cannot be pigeonholed as
contracts or property cases (or both) in any traditional sense. 9 Once
848. See generally id.
849. See generally id.
850. See generally id.
851. Geronimo v. Obama, 725 F. Supp. 2d 182 (D.D.C. 2010).
852. Id. at 183-84.
853. Id. at 184.
854. Id. at 183-84.
855. Id. at 184.
856. Id. at 185-86.
857. Id. at 186.
858. Id. at 186-87.
859. See Savannah Cemetery Group, Inc. v. Depue-Wilbert Vault Co., 704 S.E.2d
858 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010); see also Seals v. H&F, Inc., 301 S.W.3d 237 (Tenn.
2010).
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the grief component is added to any set of straightforward laws and
facts, the dynamics change. Cemetery and human remains law can
best be seen as a form of quasi-property law.86 o Many of the terms
used and concepts referred to are property concepts. 8 6 ' However, the
unique nature of the subject - i.e., the dead and the special treatment
of the dead in Western culture - means that the judicial and legisla-
tive systems view the traditional property concepts through the lens of
grief and alter some of those traditional property law concepts to fit
this special niche of the law.862
860. See Evanston Ins. Co. v. Legacy of Life, Inc., 645 F.3d 739 (5th Cir. 2011).
861. There are certainly contracts components to cemeteries and human re-
mains issues as well. However, most of these cases revolve around the "res"
of cemeteries and human remains - the property - and thus build off of
those concepts.
862. See King v. French, 383 S.W.3d 426 (Ark. Ct. App. 2011).
